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THE CRAZY MAZE OF FOOD LABELING
AND FOOD CLAIMS LAWS
PATRICK MEYER†
INTRODUCTION
There is a de facto right in America to know what contents
make up the food we consume.1 The United States Department
of Agriculture (“USDA”) regulates food labels and label claims
made on meat, poultry, and egg products,2 and the United States
Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) regulates the labeling
and labeling claims on all other foods.3 The mission of the FDA
is to protect the health of the public.4
The FDA has the monumental task of identifying and
remedying unsubstantiated product claims. Consider the various
teas sold at cancerherbtea.com, which touted their ability to heal
cancer and dozens of similar claims as described in a recent FDA
Warning Letter.5 Some of the unsubstantiated claims included:
“Cancer Herb Tea ‘You have nothing to lose but your cancer,’ ”
“Proven to help kill the cancer cells, try out the natural herbal
†
Library Director & Associate Professor of Law, University of Detroit Mercy
School of Law. I am thankful to the editorial staff of the St. John’s Law Review for
their substantial work editing this article, to my colleague Catherine Archibald for
her extensive comments on the draft article, and colleagues Richard Broughton and
Kyle Langvardt for their expertise on constitutional law. I am also grateful to
Professor Emily Broad Leib for her comments on the original draft.
1
MICHAEL T. ROBERTS, FOOD LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 254 (2016). Roberts
notes that although it is not expressly stated in U.S. law, the concept of the
consumer’s right to know the contents in food is apparent when one considers the
increased consumer demand for food information. Id.
2
U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Food and Safety Inspection Serv., Labeling/Label
Approval, http://www.fsis.usda.gov/wps/portal/fsis/topics/regulatory-compliance/labe
ling (last updated Dec. 16, 2016); ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 208.
3
What Does FDA Regulate?, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/
AboutFDA/Transparency/Basics/ucm194879.htm (last updated Aug. 7, 2018);
ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 208.
4
What We Do, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/
WhatWeDo/default.htm (last updated March 28, 2018).
5
U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Warning Letter on cancerherbtea.com (Feb. 26,
2015) https://www.fda.gov/ICECI/EnforcementActions/WarningLetters/2015/ucm435
681.htm.
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remedy which is successfully battling the disease!,” and “help[s]
reduce and kill bad cancer cells but also helps with . . . diabetes,
insomnia, arthritis, [and] reduces fever . . . .”6 Another timeconsuming responsibility of the FDA is monitoring the marketing
of powerful drugs as dietary supplements. For instance, the FDA
recently sent a Warning Letter to Andropharm, LLC because the
company did not have the required FDA pre-approval to market
its dietary supplement that contained synthetic steroids.7 The
FDA noted that anabolic steroids could cause serious health
consequences, including “liver toxicity, testicular atrophy and
male infertility, breast enlargement in males, short stature in
children, adverse effects on blood lipid levels, and a potential to
increase the risk of heart attack and stroke.”8 This Article
critiques the role of the FDA in providing consumers with
accurate and relevant food label information, identifies
impediments in the pursuit of its mission, and offers solutions to
those impediments.
Part I of this Article traces the history of U.S. food labeling
and health claims laws. Current food laws and their regulation
have developed over time. The first federal legislation was
passed in the early 1900s. The food laws of today have certainly
been influenced by past food laws, which were largely a reaction
to societal events. A brief summary of the historical development
of our nation’s important food laws should serve to illustrate this
point. Next, Part II demonstrates the significant hurdles that
prevent the FDA from fulfilling its mission of consumer safety.
The FDA has too many regulations to enforce, too many products
and establishments to keep up with, and not enough staff or
funding to adequately do either.
Currently, supplement
manufactures are not required to submit safety evidence before
selling products.9 Therefore, the FDA does not investigate safety
issues until becoming aware of a widespread health concern. The

6

Id. (omission in original).
U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Warning Letter on Andropharm, LLC (June 5,
2017) https://www.fda.gov/ICECI/EnforcementActions/WarningLetters/2017/ucm56
1975.htm.
8
Id.
9
Maggie Dickens, Comment, Safe Until Proven Unsafe: Solving the Growing
Debate Around Dietary Supplement Regulation, 15 WAKE FOREST J. BUS. & INTELL.
PROP. L. 576, 577–89 (2015); Natalie R. Bilbrough, Comment, The FDA, Congress,
and Mobile Health Apps: Lessons from DSHEA and the Regulation of Dietary
Supplements, 74 MD. L. REV. 921, 944–46 (2015); Andrea M. Pezzullo, Note, The
Crusade Against Misleading Labels, 49 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 323, 338 (2016).
7
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administrative hurdles are not internal to the FDA. The FDA is
one of several agencies responsible for the regulation of food, and
there are differing rules and key term definitions between agency
regulations. Having varying rules and term definitions makes
for conflicting laws and consumer confusion.
Part III reviews studies on the effectiveness of food labels
and health claims, as well as how the courts have treated health
claims.
Finally, Part IV argues that food and nutrition
supplement laws should be streamlined. Although several
authors ably identify solutions for how this may be accomplished,
the sheer number of solutions that have been posited over the
past several years is too plentiful to reasonably implement.
Therefore, this Article suggests a combination of a few solutions
that, taken together, are manageable implementations, which
will maximize positive change in food law protections. The
proposed improvements to food laws will be limited to
establishing a simple mandatory front-of-package labeling
scheme that will include: (1) eliminating structure/function
claims; (2) greatly revising and simplifying nutrition content
claims laws; (3) having the FDA issue letter grades for products
based on evidence of health claims while allowing agreed-on
health claims language to appear on the label; and (4) deferring
to the expertise of the FDA in the courts.
I.

HISTORY OF U.S. FOOD LABEL LAWS & HEALTH CLAIMS

Congress first recognized the need to protect citizens
purchasing food by passing the first national legislative act
relating to food law, the Pure Food and Drug Act, in 1906.10 The
Act prohibited adulterated foods or drugs and false and
misleading statements describing the overall identity of the
product, but did not require the listing of specific ingredients or
nutritional content.11 Congress amended the Pure Food and
10

ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 210; Pure Food Act, Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat.
768 (1906) (repealed 1938).
11
§§ 1-13, 34 Stat. at 768–72; ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 210–11; Jason M.
Szanyi, Brain Food: Bringing Psychological Insights to Bear on Modern Nutrition
Labeling Efforts, 65 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 159, 159 (2010); Josh Dhyani, Science-Based
Food Labels: Improving Regulations & Preventing Consumer Deception Through
Limited Information Disclosure Requirements, 26 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 1, 7 (2016).
The Act defined a drug product as being “adulterated” if it lacked the typical
“standard of strength, quality, or purity.” § 7, 34 Stat. at 769. A food product was
considered to be “adulterated” if the strength of the product was diluted by additives
or if a critical component of the food had been replaced by an inferior substance or
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Drug Act in 1912 to address drug product claims and impute
liability to manufacturers for false claims as to “the curative or
therapeutic effect” of the product or any of its ingredients.12 The
1938 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”) added a
definition for “labeling” to U.S. food laws, which included graphic
or written matter affixed to or shipped with a product.13
In 1966, Congress passed the Fair Packaging and Labeling
Act, establishing the requirements of net quantity content
labeling, label placement, label format standards, the
requirement that the manufacturer be listed on the label, and
forbidding nonfunctional “slack-fill,” where there is substantially
less of a product relative to the size of the package.14 A
subsequent regulation, enacted in 1973, augmented the Fair
Packaging and Labeling Act by requiring full nutrition labeling if
a manufacturer included any nutritional information, made a
nutrition claim, or added “vitamin[s], mineral[s], or protein[s]” to
the food.15

abstracted from the food. Id. at 769–70. A food product was said to be misbranded if,
inter alia, a statement about the product was “false or misleading.” Intent to deceive
was a requirement for a finding of liability. Id. at 770–71. The law gave the
government the authority to chemically test food but the burden of proof fell on the
government. Id. at 769. Section 4 of the Act stated that chemical examinations of
food and drug product are to be made in order to identify adulterated or misbranded
food. Id.
12
An Act to Amend Section Eight of the Food and Drugs Act, Pub. L. No. 62–
301, 37 Stat. 416–17 (1912).
13
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75–717, § 1, 52 Stat. 1040–
41 (1938) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 301 (2012)); ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 211. This
Act kept the food testing provision from the Pure Food and Drug Act, but added a
provision for factory and transport vehicle inspections. 52 Stat. at 1056–57.
14
Dhyani, supra note 11, at 14; Fair Packaging and Labeling Act, Pub. L. No.
89–755, 80 Stat. 1296–99 (1966). The definition of misrepresentation includes the
representation or implication that a product was offered “at a price lower than the
ordinary and customary retail sale price or that a . . . price advantage is
accorded . . . by reason of the size of that package or the quantity of its contents.” § 5,
80 Stat. at 1299.
15
Regulations for the Enforcement of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
and the Fair Package and Labeling Act, 38 Fed. Reg. 6951, 6959–61 (Mar. 14, 1973)
(to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1). If “vitamin[s], mineral[s], or protein[s]” were added
to the food, then serving size, servings per container, calories, protein, carbohydrate,
fat, and percentage of recommended daily allowances had to be added to the label.
Id. at 6959–60. If cholesterol information was included on the label, full nutritional
labeling was required. Id. at 6962; see also id. at 6952. The regulation stated that a
product could not claim to be a “significant source” of a nutrient unless it contained
at least ten percent of the Recommended Dietary Allowance per serving, and could
not claim to be “nutritionally superior” to another product unless there was at least
10 percent more of the nutrient in the product per serving. Id. at 6960.
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Congress responded to the need for consistent food labeling
by passing the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990
(“NLEA”), which created mandatory food labeling requirements
and qualified nutrient claim parameters.16 The NLEA required
certain nutritional facts including calories, serving size, number
of servings per container, total fat, total calories, saturated fat,
cholesterol, sugars, and sodium be displayed on all food
products.17 The NLEA also forbade nutrition content claims if
the term was not already defined by the FDA.18 Further, the
NLEA restricted the use of health claims in marketing and
branding unless the FDA had issued a regulation allowing the
claim.19 In 1997, the FDA began to allow health claims if a
scientific body of the government had published an “authoritative
statement” in support of the claim.20
In an effort to provide citizens with more useful information
regarding dietary supplements,21 Congress amended the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, with the Dietary Supplement
Health and Education Act of 1994 (“DSHEA”).22 Under the
DSHEA, the burden to prove that a supplement is adulterated or

16

Camille Currey, Note, Despite What You’ve Been Sold – Unwrapping the
Falsities Surrounding Food Labels, 118 W. VA. L. REV. 1279, 1293 (2016); ROBERTS,
supra note 1, at 231; Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101535, 104 Stat. 2353, 2357-61 (1990) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 301 (2012)); Dhyani,
supra note 11, at 16–17.
17
§ 2, 104 Stat. at 2353. However, food sold at restaurants was exempt from the
NLEA. See § 2, 104 Stat. at 2355.
18
ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 231; § 2, 104 Stat. at 2357–58.
19
ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 231; § 3, 104 Stat. at 2357, 2359–60.
20
ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 231–32 (citing § 343 of the Food and Drug
Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115, 111 Stat. 2296,
2350–51). In addition, the NLEA required the FDA to define the terms “free,” “low,”
“light,” “reduced,” “less,” and “high.” § 2, 104 Stat. at 2361. These terms were defined
in the final regulation Food Labeling: Nutrient Content Claims, General Principles,
Petitions, Definition of Terms. Food Labeling: Nutrient Content Claims, General
Principles, Petitions, Definition of Terms, Definitions of Nutrient Content Claims for
the Fat, Fatty Acid, and Cholesterol Content of Food, 58 Fed. Reg. 2302, 2412 (Jan.
6, 1993) (to be codified at 1 C.F.R. pts. 5, 101).
21
ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 322; see also, Regulation of Dietary Supplements,
58 Fed. Reg. 33690, 33691 (June 18, 1993) (The Dietary Supplement Task Force was
established in May of 1991 to review dietary supplement rules, in part because of
two significant public health outbreaks related to the use of dietary supplements. In
May of 1992, the task force submitted its report, identifying “the safety of
ingredients in dietary supplements as the overriding concern for FDA as it develops
a regulatory framework to distinguish among dietary supplement products.”).
22
Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-417,
108 Stat. 4325 (1994).
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contains false or misleading labeling shifts to the FDA.23 The
DSHEA only applies to supplements that contain ingredients
first marketed after October 14, 1994.24 The DSHEA allows
product removal proceedings to commence only if it is determined
that the claim rises to the stratospheric level of being an
“imminent hazard to public health or safety.”25 The DSHEA
allows supplement manufacturers to make a nutrition claim
provided they include a disclaimer stating that the FDA had not
evaluated the claim.26
In order to increase consumer safety,27 in 2006, Congress
amended the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act with the
Dietary Supplement and Nonprescription Drug Consumer
Protection Act.28 Section 3 of the amended act requires dietary
supplement manufacturers to submit reports of “serious adverse
event[s]” to the FDA.29 The Act defines a “Serious [A]dverse
[E]vent” as an event leading to death, hospitalization, a “lifethreatening experience,” “persistent or significant disability or
incapacity,” “a congenital anomaly or birth defect,” or which
requires medical intervention.30
This system is necessary
because U.S. law treats nutritional supplements as food and not
medication, so there is no need to prove safety or effectiveness
before a product enters the market.31 The FDA does not
investigate health concerns unless there are enough reported
“serious adverse events.”32 However, even though reporting is
required, it is estimated that only two percent of serious adverse

23

Id. at 4328-29.
Id. at 4331-32; Bilbrough, supra note 9, at 946.
25
§ 4, 108 Stat. at 4328; Bilbrough, supra note 9, at 946.
26
§ 4, 108 Stat. at 4329; see also Bilbrough, supra note 9, at 948.
27
S. REP. NO. 109–324, at 1–2 (2006) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 2006
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1841, 1841–42.
28
Dietary Supplement and Nonprescription Drug Consumer Protection Act,
Pub. L. No. 109–462, 120 Stat. 3469 (2006).
29
Id. at 3472–73.
30
Id.
31
Rick Schmitt, Supplement Pills That Promise Too Much, AARP BULLETIN
(June 2016), https://www.aarp.org/health/drugs-supplements/info-2016/drug-vitamin
-supplement-claims.html.
32
ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 326–27. Because there is no pre-approval required
for food, “the FDA relies on the adverse event reporting system” to identify product
safety issues. Id. at 326; FDA Adverse Event Reporting System (FAERS): Latest
Quarterly Data Files, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/Guid
anceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Surveillance/AdverseDrugEffects/ucm08219
3.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2018).
24
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events were reported to the FDA.33 The FDA also does not preapprove food labels for nutritional content accuracy.34 Instead,
the FDA spot checks manufacturers after consumer complaints
are lodged.35
Several types of claims can be advertised on packaging
labels. First, “structure/function claims” are allowed to describe
the role an ingredient plays in the “normal structure or function
of the human body.”36 Nutrition content claims, which state the
nutritional makeup of the product, are allowed as long as the
FDA has defined the ingredient.37 Third, “health claims” state
that the product reduces the chances of obtaining a disease or
alleviates a health condition.38 If there is some credible evidence
to support the health claim, but not to the level that satisfies a
significant scientific agreement standard, then an FDA crafted
disclaimer that qualifies the claim must appear on the product
label.39 This is called a “Qualified Health Claim.”40 Since the
early 2000s, courts have required the FDA to issue carefully
worded disclaimers for qualified health claims, instead of
categorically denying them.41 Unqualified health claims or
authorized health claims are approved by the FDA if they meet
the high evidentiary standard of significant scientific
agreement.42 According to the FDA:

33
Bilbrough, supra note 9, at 949 (citing Richard Potomac, Are You Sure You
Want to Eat That?: U.S. Government and Private Regulation of Domestically
Produced and Marketed Dietary Supplements, 23 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 54, 66
(2010)).
34
ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 212; Lisa Heinzerling, The Varieties and Limits of
Transparency in U.S. Food Law, 70 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 11, 18 (2015).
35
ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 212.
36
Structure/Function Claims, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/
Food/LabelingNutrition/ucm2006881.htm (last updated Dec. 14, 2017) [hereinafter
Structure/Function Claims]. An example of a “structure/function claim” is “calcium
builds strong bones.” Id.
37
Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101–535, 104 Stat.
2353, 2357–58 (1990) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 343).
38
Label Claims for Conventional Foods and Dietary Supplements, U.S. FOOD
AND DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/Food/LabelingNutrition/ucm111447.htm
(last updated June 19, 2018) [hereinafter Label Claims]; Question and Answers on
Health Claims in Food Labeling, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/
Food/LabelingNutrition/ucm207974.htm (last updated Dec. 13, 2017).
39
Questions and Answers on Health Claims in Food Labeling, supra note 38.
40
Id.
41
See infra Part III.C.
42
See Authorized Health Claims That Meet The Significant Scientific Agreement
(SSA) Standard, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/Food/Labeling
Nutrition/ucm2006876.htm (last updated Jan, 12, 2018).
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To be approved by the FDA as an authorized health claim, there
must be significant scientific agreement (“SSA”) among
qualified experts that the claim is supported by the totality of
publicly available scientific evidence for a substance/disease
relationship. The SSA standard is intended to be a strong
standard that provides a high level of confidence in the validity
of the substance/disease relationship.43

II. PROBLEMS WITH U.S. FOOD LAW GOVERNANCE
There are estimated to be between 50,000 and 100,000
dietary supplements currently being sold.44 The number of
supplements for the FDA to monitor, combined with the lack of
pre-approval laws, causes investigations into health-related
claims to commence after too many people have been injured
because the FDA relies on consumer reports through the adverse
event system.45 When regulators obtain convictions for illegal
behavior, the penalty is often a civil fine that, although
substantial, still pales in comparison to the money that is made
because of the false claims.46 For example, Dannon recently
claimed that its Activia yogurt regulates digestion and its
DanActive drink helps prevent the flu and colds.47 In 2010, The
FTC reached a $21 million settlement with Dannon.48 In the
meantime, it is suspected that Dannon made more than that
amount49 in the $3.7 billion U.S. Greek yogurt market.50
43
Id. (citation omitted); see also U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Guidance for
Industry: Evidence-Based Review System For the Scientific Evaluation of Human
Claims,
https://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceRegulation/GuidanceDocumentsRegulatoryInfor
mation/ucm073332.htm (last updated Sept. 19, 2018). This document provides a full
explanation of the evidentiary standard used by the FDA.
44
Schmitt, supra note 31.
45
Id.
46
Id.; Dickens, supra note 9, at 587 (noting that “[t]he economic growth of the
industry due to the ability to escape regulations is too large for miniscule
settlements to deter the industry from changing its own practices.”).
47
Currey, supra note 16, at 1279-80; Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n,
Dannon Agrees to Drop Exaggerated Health Claims for Activia Yogurt and
DanActive Dairy Drink (Dec. 15, 2010), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/pressreleases/2010/12/dannon-agrees-drop-exaggerated-health-claims-activia-yogurt.
48
Bailey Mosier, Dannon Fined $21M for False Marketing, EMPOWHER (Dec.
16, 2010), http://www.empowher.com/healthy-eating/content/dannon-fined-21m-false
-marketing?page=0,0.
49
Currey, supra note 16, at 1279–80. See generally Schmitt, supra note 31.
Paying a large fine is a minor cost of doing business.
50
U.S. Greek Yogurt Market – Statistics & Facts, STATISTA,
https://www.statista.com/topics/2351/greek-yogurt/ (last visited Sept. 29, 2018).
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The dietary supplement industry is very large and has its
share of false advertising claims. A senior attorney for AARP
Foundation Litigation stated that the cost of supplements sold
with inaccurate claims is in the billions of dollars.51 The
potential profits incentivize companies to keep marketing their
products in the same way and treat government fines as the “cost
of doing business.”52 Further, even after issuing fines, the FTC
sometimes permits a company to market a product with a new
message that can still seem to be misleading. For example, CVS
Pharmacy, Walmart, Walgreens, Rite Aid, and others sold
BrainStrong Adult with DHA, an ingredient that marketers
promoted as “[c]linically shown to improve adult memory.”53 A
2014 FTC Consent Order forbid the manufacturers from making
any representation, either explicitly or implicitly, that their
products “improve[] memory in adults” or “prevent[] cognitive
decline . . . in adults” without “reliable scientific evidence.”54
However, one of the successor manufacturers of BrainStrong
Adult subsequently offered a similar product for sale, and
marketed the product with claims of “pure DHA for memory
support.”55 The change from using the phrase “improves memory
in adults” to “memory support” seems to violate the 2014 FTC
order that forbade implied claims of memory enhancement.56
Two subsequent class action lawsuits against CVS will determine
if similar advertising is acceptable as it pertains to another of
their products containing DHA.57 The product is still being sold
with the new message intact.58

51

Schmitt, supra note 31.
Id.
53
Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Supplement Marketers Settle FTC Charges
that “BrainStrong Adult” Memory Improvement Claims Are Deceptive (June 9, 2014),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/06/supplement-marketerssettle-ftc-charges-brainstrong-adult-memory.
54
Id.; I-Health, Inc., F.T.C. 1, 3 (2014), 2014 WL 4252391.
55
Short Memory Lands CVS Brain Supplement in Legal Trouble, TRUTH IN
ADVERTISING (June 7, 2016), https://www.truthinadvertising.org/memory-lands-cvssupplement-in-trouble/.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
CVS Health Algal-900 DHA Softgels, CVS PHARMACY, https://www.cvs.com/shop/cvshealth-algal-900-dha-softgels-prodid-1070656?skuId=794904 (last visited Sept. 28,
2018).
52
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The marketers of the popular supplement Prevagen are
making similar memory claims.59
Further, the Prevagen
television commercial states that it is “clinically proven to
improve short term memory.”60 Prevagen states that a “doubleblinded, placebo-controlled trial,” which is detailed on its
website,61 supports their claims even though they note the FDA
did not review the statement.62 The experiment in question,
named the Madison Study, consisted of 218 subjects with “selfreported memory concerns.”63 The manufacturer of Prevagen,
Quincy Bioscience, sponsored the study.64 Quantitative tests
were administered at five intervals during the ninety-day
period.65 The results showed that “Prevagen demonstrated the
ability to improve aspects of cognitive function in older
participants with either normal cognitive aging or very mild
There are two major concerns with the
impairment.”66
methodology. First, there are concerns of bias because the study
was sponsored by the manufacturer. Second, the participants
have “self-reported memory concerns” as opposed to medically
documented memory concerns.
FDA administrators admit the disadvantages they face in
their ability to catch false advertisements.67 Recent examples of
the scope of false advertising include claims that Amberen would
59

TINA.org to FTC: Prevagen is Making Unsupported Memory Claims, TRUTH
ADVERTISING (Sept. 20, 2015), https://www.truthinadvertising.org/prevagen-ftccomplaint/; Madison Memory Study: A Randomized, Double-Blinded, PlaceboControlled Trial of Apoaequorin in Community-Dwelling, Older Adults, QUINCY
BIOSCIENCE (Aug. 1, 2016), http://www.prevagen.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/
02/ClinicalTrialSynopsis-cmk816.pdf [hereinafter Madison Memory Study].
60
This author first noted watching the commercial on the CNN channel on
Tuesday morning, August 2, 2016 and has seen it on air through February 2018. The
commercial noted it was available at CVS.
61
Madison Memory Study, supra note 59, at 1.
62
PREVAGEN, https://www.prevagen.com (last visited Sept. 28, 2018).
63
Madison Memory Study, supra note 59, at 4.
64
Id. at 1.
65
Id. at 2–3.
66
Id. at 9.
67
Michael Taylor, How the FDA is Picking Its Food Label Battles, THE
ATLANTIC (July 19, 2010), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2010/07/howthe-fda-is-picking-its-food-label-battles/59927/. Taylor, then Deputy Commissioner
for Foods at the FDA, noted that the FDA is forced to pick its battles concerning
marketing claims, stating “[w]e have no pre-market review authority over such
claims, and, under prevailing legal doctrines concerning ‘commercial free speech,’
the evidentiary requirements placed on FDA to prove that such claims are
misleading are significant and costly to meet. Moreover, meeting them requires
tapping the same team of nutritionists, labeling experts, and lawyers who are
working on our other nutrition initiatives.” Id. See also infra Part IV.C.
IN

2018]

SOLVING THE CRAZY MAZE OF FOOD LAWS

243

relieve symptoms of menopause,68 a product claiming it prevents
gray hair,69 that the health benefits of Eukanuba dog food were
scientifically proven,70 and that POM Wonderful’s Pomegranate
Juice and POMx supplements “could treat, prevent, or reduce the
risk of heart disease, prostate cancer, and erectile dysfunction,
and were clinically proven to have such benefits.”71
A.

Problems Related to the FDA

The problems with the FDA and its regulatory ability have
been widely written about and many of the articles are
summarized below.
The FDA has too much to regulate. Considering the health
supplement portion of the FDA’s duties alone shows how
inadequately the FDA is staffed. Over half of the U.S. population
take health supplements.72 The FDA must also regulate over
500,000 food products, “tens of thousands” of companies, and
scores of new products that are introduced each year in the U.S.
market.73 In addition, there are reportedly over 1,000 food
additives on the FDA substance inventory list that they have not
investigated.74 However, the Center for Food Safety and Applied
Nutrition within the FDA, which is in charge of nutrition,

68

Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Marketers of Dietary Supplement
Amberen Settle FTC Charges Regarding Misleading Weight-Loss and Menopause
Relief Claims (May 20, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/
2016/05/marketers-dietary-supplement-amberen-settle-ftc-charges-regarding.
69
Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Challenges Markters’ Baseless
Claims That Their Supplements Prevent or Reverse Gray Hair (May 13, 2015),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2015/05/ftc-challenges-marketersbaseless-claims-their-supplements.
70
Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Approves Final Order Settling Charges
that Mars Petcare Made False Health Claims for Its Eukanuba Brand Dog Food (Dec. 13,
2016), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2016/12/ftc-approves-finalorder-settling-charges-mars-petcare-made-false.
71
Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Statement of FTC Chairwoman Edith
Ramirez Regarding Supreme Court’s Decision Not to Review POM Wonderful Case
(May 2, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2016/05/statement-ftcchairwoman-edith-ramirez-regarding-supreme-courts.
72
Madison Park, Half of Americans Use Supplements, CNN (Apr. 13, 2011),
http://edition.cnn.com/2011/HEALTH/04/13/supplements.dietary/index.html.
73
See Heinzerling, supra note 34, at 15.
74
Brett M. Paben, Lack of Interest in Consumer Interests: FDA’s Narrow
Perspective on Food Labeling and Label Statements Undermines a Century of Agency
Leadership, 13 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 174, 186 (2015) (citing the Substances
Added to Foods list, formerly called Everything Added to Food in the United States
(EAFUS) at http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/fcn/fcnnavigation.cfm?rpt=eafus
listing).
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labeling, and dietary supplements, has just over 1,000
employees,75 raising the issue of how consumers are to stay safe
(make healthy choices/know what they are eating) if the FDA
cannot keep up.76
Further, some authors view the FDA as a reactionary body
since it has stopped random sampling of foods, and since there
are limited pre-market approval requirements.77 There is no premarket approval requirement for dietary supplements except for
products that contain ingredients first marketed after October
14, 1994, and there is no scientific testing requirement at all.78
When the FDA last conducted random sampling twenty years
ago, it found that between 30% and 50% of all 300 products
tested listed some vitamin amounts on the Nutrition Facts panel
that substantially differed from the actual amounts.79
The FDA’s authority has been eroded by recent court
decisions. Traditionally, the courts gave the FDA the highest
deference in interpreting its regulations, but this is no longer the
case for product claims.80 Although the FDA creates its own
procedures and rules,81 fewer than half of consumers feel that the
FDA provides adequate information on food content.82

75
U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION
DISTRIBUTION OF FULL-TIME EQUIVALENT (FTE) EMPLOYMENT PROGRAM LEVEL,
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/ReportsManualsForms/Reports/BudgetRep
orts/UCM301553.pdf (last visited Sept. 28, 2018).
76
Paben, supra note 74, at 186.
77
Dickens, supra note 9, at 577–78 (“[R]egulations covering dietary
supplements are somewhat laxed.”). Dickens goes on to state as examples that
dietary supplements require no pre-market approval and that they are presumed
safe until the FDA is alerted to an issue. Id. Bilbrough, supra note 9, at 944–47
(noting that the “FDA now has a purely reactionary role” because there is no premarket approval for dietary supplements unless they contain a new ingredient.
Further, the FDA has very high burden of proof when investigating a potentially
harmful product); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FOOD LABELING: FDA
NEEDS TO BETTER LEVERAGE RESOURCES, IMPROVE OVERSIGHT, AND EFFECTIVELY
USE AVAILABLE DATA TO HELP CONSUMERS SELECT HEALTHY FOODS 17 (2008).
78
Dickens, supra note 9, at 577-80; Bilbrough, supra note 9, at 944–46;
Pezzullo, supra note 9, at 338.
79
Id. The FDA characterizes this substantial difference to be outside the
allowable range. Id.; see also Heinzerling, supra note 34, at 17.
80
Paben, supra note 74, at 205–06 (referencing Auer Deference, per the case
Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997)); see also infra Part III.C.
81
Paben, supra note 74, at 174.
82
Id. at 176–77 (citing INTERNATIONAL FOOD INFORMATION COUNCIL
FOUNDATION, 2014 FOOD AND HEALTH SURVEY (2014)).
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The FDA does not investigate a supplement until notified of
a problem.83 Due to their limited resources, the FDA must
prioritize which complaints to pursue, which often means taking
action on products for which the most claims have been made.84
Further, unlike the prescription industry, dietary supplement
manufacturers are not required to submit evidence of safety via
clinical trials to the FDA before their products are offered for
sale.85 Additionally, the FDA sees itself as only being able to act
on “proven health and safety risks,” which precludes it from
taking any proactive measures.86 For all of these reasons, the
FDA is considered a reactionary force, as opposed to a proactive
agency.87
Some authors believe the problem with the FDA and other
agencies tasked with regulating food is the regulatory
fragmentation caused by the different missions, cultures, and
regulations of these agencies, and because of manufacturer
influence.88 An example of regulatory fragmentation is that the
USDA requires pre-approval of product labels but the FDA does
not.89 Another source of fragmentation is the number of agencies
with the power to regulate food laws. In 2011, the Government
Accountability Office reported that there were fifteen agencies
with the authority to regulate food safety.90
83

Dickens, supra note 9, at 578.
Taylor, supra note 67 (noting how incredibly difficult and fruitless it is to go
after companies and their teams of creative marketers).
85
Dickens, supra note 9, at 580–81.
86
Melissa Mortazavi, Tort As Democracy: Lessons From the Food Wars, 57 ARIZ.
L. REV. 929, 942 (2015) (citing All. for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala, 116 F. Supp. 2d 166,
179 (D.D.C. 2000)).
87
Dickens, supra note 9, at 577–78; Bilbrough, supra note 9, at 946; Jennifer L.
Pomeranz, A Comprehensive Strategy to Overhaul FDA Authority for Misleading
Food Labels, 39 AM. J. L. & MED. 617, 639 (2013).
88
See Heinzerling, supra note 34, at 14, 18; Christine Donovan, Note, If FDA
Does Not Regulate Food, Who Will? A Study of Hormones and Antibiotics in Meat
Production, 41 AM. J.L. & MED. 459, 467 (2015) (describing the fragmented authority
between the FDA and USDA); Richard A. Merrill & Jeffrey K. Francer, Organizing
Federal Food Safety Regulations, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 61, 127–128 (2000) (noting
that there is no single voice advocating for food safety, causing lack of accountability,
ineffective allocation of resources, and lack of consistent policy); Amalea
Smirniotopoulos, Bad Medicine: Prescription Drugs, Preemption, and the Potential
for a No-Fault Fix, 35 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 793, 808–10 (2012) (FDA is
subject to manufacturer influence); Bilbrough, supra note 9, at 942–46 (DSHEA was
strongly influenced by the supplement industry).
89
Heinzerling, supra note 34, at 18; ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 212.
90
Dan Flynn, GAO Report Calls for Single Food Safety Agency, FOOD SAFETY
NEWS (Mar. 2, 2011), http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2011/03/call-for-one-foodsafety-agency-leads-historic-gao-report/#.V9ngaPkrLIU.
84

246

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 92:233

Authors have noted that FDA regulations can be
contradictory, misleading, or ambiguous.91 For instance, in
determining whether chain restaurants fall under the nutritional
information burdens of the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”), the FDA
defined the term “[l]ocation” as a “fixed position or site,” which
eliminated all mobile establishments from the ACA menu
requirements.92 Another example is the phrase “all natural,”
which suggests that no harmful ingredients are present in the
product, although that is not always the case.93 About two-thirds
of consumers believe that “natural” means that there are no
artificial ingredients in the product.94 Yet the FDA has not
defined the term.95 The FDA cannot enforce its food laws when
there is regulatory ambiguity.96
Voluntary industry programs, often called “third party
verification,” provide standards that compete with FDA
regulations.
For instance, the “Facts Up Front” labeling
program, created by the Grocery Manufacturers Association and
the Food Marketing Institute, includes a set of voluntary front-ofpackage labeling guidelines.97 Its voluntary nature suggests that
manufacturers of unhealthy products will not choose to use the
system at all.98 Having the industry, whose goal is to maximize
91
Paben, supra note 74, at 185–86 (FDA has not defined “natural,” leading to
confused consumers; FDA policies are designed to “assure ambiguity”); Stephanie
Russ, Does This Law Make My Butt Look Big? Part II: No, But Food Does: An
Overview of the FDA’s Menu Labeling Requirements, 35 FRANCHISE L.J. 61, 61–64
(2015). In describing the new food regulations pertaining to the Affordable Care Act
(“ACA”) (79 Fed. Reg. 71157), Russ describes what can only be viewed as a complex
set of regulations that both expand and limit establishments that are required to
abide by labeling provisions of the ACA. Restaurants are now covered, but not
unless they are part of a chain of twenty or more restaurants. Id. Schools are not
covered. Id. Mobile food services, such as food trucks, trains or airplanes, are exempt
from regulation. Food Labeling; Nutrition Labeling of Standard Menu Items in
Restaurants and Similar Retail Food Establishments, 79 Fed. Reg. 71156, 71159
(Dec. 1, 2014) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 11, 101) [hereinafter Food Labeling
2014].
92
Food Labeling 2014, supra note 91, at 71254.
93
Dickens, supra note 9, at 584.
94
Paben, supra note 74, at 185 (citing CONSUMER REP. NAT’L RES. CTR., FOOD
LABELS SURVEY (2014)).
95
Id.; U.S. Food & Drug Admin., “Natural” on Food Labeling,
https://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceRegulation/GuidanceDocumentsRegulatoryInfor
mation/LabelingNutrition/ucm456090.htm (last updated Nov. 11, 2017).
96
See Paben, supra note 74, at 186; Pomeranz, supra note 87, at 628.
97
Grocery Manufacturers Ass’n, Facts-Up-Front Front of Package Labeling
Initiative, GMA, http://www.gmaonline.org/issues-policy/health-nutrition/facts-upfront-front-of-pack-labeling-initiative/ (last visited Sept. 28, 2018).
98
Currey, supra note 16, at 1302–04.
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profits, craft such a program will likely lead to lax standards.99
Similarly, industry-initiated eco-labels, which are not regulated
by the FDA, convey messages, logos, stamps, or seals, tout only
the positive and ignore the negative.100 The FDA should be able
to ban any competing labeling standards.
B. Problems With U.S. Food Laws
There are concerns with the Dietary Supplement Health and
Education Act of 1994 (“DSHEA”) and with other food labeling
laws.
In enacting DSHEA, Congress noted that one of the most
important functions of the federal government is improving the
health of its citizens, and that nutritional supplementation plays
an important role in achieving that function.101 Congress noted
that about 50% of Americans utilized dietary supplements.102
Although the FDA had proposed stricter supplement regulations
such as requiring pre-approval of supplements that make drug
claims,103 DSHEA was met with strong pushback from the
supplement industry.104 As mentioned earlier, this influence led
Congress to include the following changes when enacting the
99

Id. at 1303 (citing Center of Science in the Public Interest Executive Director
Michael Jacobsen, who states that manufactures are free to only highlight the
healthy components of the food, and not the unhealthy components, under the Facts
Up Front Program) (citations omitted).
100
Paben, supra note 74, at 187–88 (stating that in the U.S., manufactures use
environmental claims on eco-labels as they see fit since they are not regulated, and
that such labels “provide little value to the consumer and are often mere
‘greenwashing.’ ”).
101
Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-417,108
Stat. 4325, 4325 (1994).
102
Id. at 4326.
103
Regulation of Dietary Supplements, 58 Fed. Reg. 33690, 33697 (June 18,
1993).
104
Arnold I. Friede, Dietary Supplements: Background for Dialogue Between the
Industry and the Medical Profession, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 413, 419 (1998) (“The
dietary supplement industry fought long and hard . . . for the relief provided by
DSHEA from what was perceived to be arbitrary, onerous, and unnecessary
regulation.”); Bilbrough, supra note 9, at 942–46 (“The FDA’s proposal was followed
by industry pushback . . . .”); Jennifer Kay Braman, Note, Food for Sport or Faustian
Bargain: Regulating Performance Enhancing Dietary Supplements, 47 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 417, 426–427 (1999) (noting “the enormous influence of the dietary supplement
business.”); see also 139 CONG. REC. S4577-4578 (daily ed. Apr. 7, 1993) (Statement
of Sen. Hatch). Hatch decidedly criticized the FDA for being anti-consumer over the
prior thirty years, including how it handled DSHEA (S. 784), suggesting industry
hostility toward the FDA and noting industry support for DSHEA. Hatch was,
however, careful not to attribute his condemnation to the industry. Rather, his
argument was framed from the standpoint of a loss of consumer choice.
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DSHEA: (1) the burden to prove adulteration or false or
misleading information shifted to the FDA,105 (2) the law only
applied to new supplement ingredients,106 (3) the DSHEA
established an “imminent hazard” standard of proof in order to
remove a product from sale,107 and (4) it allowed manufacturers
to use unsubstantiated product label claims as long as a
disclaimer was included stating the FDA had not evaluated the
claim.108
The manufacturer-friendly nature of the DSHEA
encouraged the introduction of many more supplement products
into the market at the time of the passage of the DSHEA.
Congress noted that in 1994 there were about 4,000 dietary
supplements in the marketplace, with total annual sales of about
$4 billion.109 By 2012, the estimate was 55,000 supplements in
the marketplace.110
Today, it is estimated that the U.S.
supplement industry rakes in $37 billion annually.111 For the
reasons stated above, experts believe that the DSHEA is lax,
which attracts manufacturers who are intent on maximizing
profits with little regulatory oversight.112
Lobbyists have
incentive to put millions of dollars into keeping DSHEA the
same.113
Consumers are confused by food labels and label claims.114
For instance, having food labels on the back of products is less
effective than the front.115 Authors note that “hidden trade-off
105

§ 4, 109 Stat. at 4328–29.
§ 8, 109 Stat. at 4331–32; Bilbrough, supra note 9, at 946.
107
§ 4, 109 Stat. at 4328; Bilbrough, supra note 9, at 946.
108
§ 6, 109 Stat. at 4329; see Bilbrough, supra note 9, at 948.
109
§ 3, 109 Stat, at 4326; Bilbrough, supra note 9, at 947.
110
Bilbrough, supra note 9, at 947.
111
John Bradley, NBJ: The US Supplement Industry is $37 billion, not $12
Billion, NUTRITION BUSINESS JOURNAL (June 1, 2015), http://www.nutraingredientsusa.com/Markets/NBJ-The-US-supplement-industry-is-37-billion-not-12-billion; see
also Baird, Retail Sales of Vitamins & Nutritional Supplements in the United States
from 2000 to 2017 (in Billion U.S. dollars), STATISTA, http://www.statista.com/
statistics/235801/retail-sales-of-vitamins-and-nutritional-supplements-in-the-us/
(last visited Sept. 28, 2018).
112
Dickens, supra note 9, at 583–84, 587.
113
Melanie Zanona, How the Dietary Supplement Industry Masters the Hill, CQ
WEEKLY (June 1, 2015), http://melaniezanona.com/dietarysupplements/.
114
Paben, supra note 74, at 175.
115
Marianne Smith Edge et al., The Impact of Variations in a Fact-Based Frontof-Package Nutrition Labeling System on Consumer Comprehension, 114 J. ACAD.
NUTRITION & DIETETICS 843, 851 (2014) (although front-of-package labeling
generally leads to increased accuracy in identifying product nutrition levels and
lessens the necessity of perusing the nutrition facts label, such labeling is
particularly helpful to those with lower education levels); Dhyani, supra note 11, at
106
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claims” on the front of an item can mislead consumers into
thinking products are healthier than they are.116 These claims
highlight healthy ingredients but fail to mention ingredients
located on the back label that may be unhealthy or less
healthy.117 Manufacturers are tempted to highlight a beneficial
component of a product and ignore the negative.118
C. More Limits to FDA Power: Recent Case Law Decisions
The recent court-imposed limits on food label claims have
developed substantially over a forty-year period. In 1976, the
United States Supreme Court held in Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council that an
advertiser’s purely economic motive is afforded First Amendment
protection because the free flow of commercial information may
be useful to the consumer.119 That holding eventually affected
food product claims. The 1980 Supreme Court case Central
Hudson Gas & Electric v. Public Service Commission of New York
introduced an intermediate level of scrutiny to examine whether
the speech had First Amendment protections, which consisted of
four parts: (1) whether the speech is lawful and not misleading, if
so (2) “whether the asserted government interest is substantial,”
(3) “whether the regulation directly advances the governmental
interest asserted,” and (4) “whether it is not more extensive than
is necessary to serve that interest.”120
Subsequently, in In re R.M.J., the Supreme Court held that
although inherently misleading commercial speech may be
prohibited in its entirety, potentially misleading speech may not

30 (suggesting that the most important information should go on the front of the
label); European Society of Cardiology, Members of European Parliament Discuss
Food Labeling and Hearth Health (June 5, 2008), http://esciencenews.com/articles/
2008/06/05/members.european.parliament.discuss.food.labeling.and.heart.health
(“Front of pack labelling should allow consumers to know at a glance whether a
product contributes to their health or not.").
116
Dhyani, supra note 11, at 37–38.
117
Id.
118
Dickens, supra note 9, at 584.
119
Va. State Bd. Of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748,
762–65 (1976).
120
Central Hudson Gas & Electric v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,
566 (1980).
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be banned if it could be offered in a non-deceptive way.121 The In
re R.M.J. Court suggested that a disclaimer would suffice instead
of an outright ban.122
Starting in 1999, and expanding on In re R.M.J., a string of
decisions curtailed the FDA’s power to ban misleading speech.
The trouble for the FDA started with Pearson v. Shalala
(“Pearson I”), where the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia struck down the FDA decision to
unilaterally ban potentially misleading health claims on
nutritional supplements because the court felt doing so was a
violation of the fourth part of the Central Hudson test—the
“reasonable fit” requirement.123 The court held that an outright
ban on potentially misleading health claims was unconstitutional
and that instead the FDA could require that disclaimers be
used.124 The Pearson I court gave the FDA guidance when it
noted that a health claim can be banned by the FDA when
supporting evidence for the claim is weaker than contrary
evidence.125 The FDA revised its rules in light of the Pearson I
decision, denied the claims of the manufacturer from Pearson I,
and lost again when challenged in district court because of its
refusal to issue disclaimers.126 In 2001, Pearson v. Thompson
(“Pearson III”) suggested that a disclaimer would have been
appropriate instead of a complete denial of the health claim.127
The D.C. District Court confirmed this position in Whitaker v.
Thompson.128
The FDA finally took the direction of the courts by
subsequently creating “qualified health claims”: a new category
of health claims supported by credible evidence.129 The FDA will
issue a disclaimer if it can remedy, or qualify, the health claim. If
121

In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982).
Id. at 201, 203.
123
Pearson v. Shalala (Pearson I), 164 F.3d 650, 657 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (typically
referred to as Pearson I, the first of three cases concerning the FDA and these
plaintiffs).
124
Id.
125
Id. at 659 n.10 (“Similarly, we see no problem with the FDA imposing an
outright ban on a claim where evidence in support of the claim
is qualitatively weaker than evidence against the claim-for example, where the claim
rests on only one or two old studies.”) (emphasis added).
126
Pearson v. Shalala (Pearson II), 130 F. Supp. 2d 105, 114 (D.D.C. 2001).
127
Pearson v. Thompson (Pearson III), 141 F. Supp. 2d 105, 110–11 (D.D.C.
2001).
128
Whitaker v. Thompson, 248 F. Supp. 2d 1, 16–17 (D.D.C. 2002).
129
Evidence-Based Review System, supra note 43, at §§ II., III.A; ROBERTS,
supra note 1, at 234.
122
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a disclaimer cannot remedy the claim, it may be banned.130 This
new category of health claims is distinct from unqualified health
claims, which are supported by significant scientific agreement
and thus need no disclaimer of qualification.131 The Whitaker
court opined that rejecting a claim without offering any
disclaimer at all should only be allowed in instances “where there
was little-to-no scientific evidence in support of the claim and
where the government could prove that the public would still be
deceived by the claim even with the use of accompanying
disclaimers.”132 However, Pearson I, the controlling Court of
Appeals case, noted that the evidentiary standard to ban a claim
is simply when supporting evidence is “outweighed” by nonsupporting evidence.133 The Pearson I court also noted that the
FDA could ban a health claim if supporting evidence is
“qualitatively weaker” than negative evidence,134 which appears
to be more in line with Central Hudson’s “more likely to deceive”
standard.135
Not only is the FDA prohibited from completely banning
potentially misleading health claims without considering the
issuance of a disclaimer, but three recent cases have also
restricted its disclaimer language, holding that strongly worded
verbiage effectively negates the claim and infringes on
commercial speech rights.136
Finally, the courts have started to exercise a stricter
standard of review for FDA actions. In a 2010 case, the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia applied an
independent review standard when deciding constitutional issues
brought against the FDA, rather than the arbitrary and
capricious standard of review that the Administrative Procedure
Act calls for.137 Although the court chose to review the FDA’s
decision under the independent review standard, it stated that it
will give some deference to the FDA’s expertise in weighing the
130

In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982).
Questions and Answers on Health Claims in Food Labeling, supra note 38.
132
Whitaker, 248 F. Supp. 2d at 13.
133
Pearson v. Shalala (Pearson I), 164 F.3d 650, 659 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
134
Id. at 659 n.10.
135
Central Hudson Gas & Electric v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,
563 (1980).
136
All. for Nat. Health U.S. v. Sebelius, 714 F. Supp. 2d 48, 71 (D.D.C. 2010);
All. for Nat. Health U.S. v. Sebelius, 786 F. Supp. 2d 1, 11–14 (D.D.C. 2011);
Fleminger v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Serv., 854 F. Supp. 2d 192, 195 (D.
Conn. 2012).
137
All. for Nat. Health U.S., 714 F. Supp. 2d at 48, 59–60.
131
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scientific evidence in denying claims.138 The independent review
standard is nonetheless tougher than the arbitrary and
capricious review standard. Under the arbitrary and capricious
standard, a court cannot subvert the expertise of an agency’s
work.139 However, under the independent review standard, a
court independently assesses the agency’s actions against the
plaintiff’s constitutional claims.140
III. ZEROING IN ON THE EFFECTIVENESS/EFFECT OF FOOD
LABELS, HEALTH CLAIMS, DISCLAIMERS, AND COURT DECISIONS
Food labeling is the main means of disseminating nutrition
content information and health claims to consumers. In addition
to traditional package labeling, restaurants are beginning to
provide nutritional information on their menus. This gives
consumers the nutritional information to make healthy dining
choices if they desire. The availability of nutritional information
presented on a restaurant menu is similar to nutritional
information presented on a food or nutritional supplement label,
in that in both instances once consumers zero in on a specific
item choice, item-specific nutritional information is visible. It is
therefore important to analyze the effectiveness of the current
labeling scheme while also determining if providing nutritional
information in restaurants is useful. Considering that any set of
laws will be compromised by non-compliance, it is also important
to assess to what extent manufacturers are complying with the
FDA’s confusing choice of label laws. Finally, recent court
decisions regarding commercial speech as it concerns label claims
must be scrutinized as another means of assessing the
effectiveness of the food law scheme.
A.

Recent U.S. Food Studies Regarding the Effectiveness of
Providing Nutrition Information

After summarizing the results of the following studies on the
effectiveness of providing nutrition information, it is clear that
the vast majority of consumers scrutinize nutrition information
on product labels141—especially for an unfamiliar product142—and
138

Id. at 60.
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29, 43 (1983); Marsh v. Oregon Nat. Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 376–78 (1989).
140
Porter v. Califano, 592 F.2d 770, 780 (5th Cir. 1979).
141
Brian Elbel et al., Calorie Labeling and Food Choices: A First Look at the
Effects on Low-Income People in New York City, 28 HEALTH AFFAIRS w1110 (2009),
139
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that nutrition labels are most effective when placed on the front
of the package.143 The presence of nutrition information effects
health by affecting healthy choices.144 Although health-conscious
consumers use nutrition information effectively,145 evidence
shows that the absence of nutrition information causes most
consumers to consistently underestimate the amount of calories
they consume.146 Further, the findings suggest that consumers
who may not necessarily consider themselves health-conscious
would make more conscious health choices if nutrition
information was provided.147
Three studies from 2002 of 292 subjects indicated that
providing nutritional information both on a product label and on
a restaurant menu positively affected product attitude, nutrition
attitude, and purchasing decisions.148 This work is important
because it tested the effectiveness of nutrition information for a

http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/28/6/w1110.full.pdf+html; Smith Edge et al.,
supra note 116, at 845; Marian Burros, Read Any Good Nutrition Labels Lately?,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 1, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/01/dining/read-any-goodnutrition-labels-lately.html?_r=0.
142
Smith Edge et al., supra note 116, at 845.
143
INT’L FOOD INFORMATION COUNCIL FOUNDATION, FRONT OF PACK LABELING
CONSUMER RESEARCH PROJECT 34 (2011), https://www.foodinsight.org/Content/3651/
IFIC%20FOP%20SLIDES%20for%20WEB2011.pdf; Smith Edge et al., supra note
116, at 851.
144
Scot Burton & Elizabeth H. Creyer, What Consumers Don’t Know Can Hurt
Them: Consumer Evaluations and Disease Risk Perceptions of Restaurant Menu
Items, 38 J. CONSUMER AFF. 121, 142 (2004) (inclusion of negative health
information on labels changed decisions to not purchase products more than did
labels that did not include any health information); Christina A. Roberto et al.,
Evaluating the Impact of Menu Labeling on Food Choices and Intake, 100 AM. J.
PUB. HEALTH 312, 314, 316 (2010).
145
Lisa J. Harnack, et al., Effects of Calorie Labeling and Value Size Pricing on
Fast Food Meal Choices: Results From an Experimental Trial, 5 INT’L J. BEHAV.
NUTRITION & PHYSICAL ACTIVITY 63, 68–71 (2008); Chung-Tung Jordan Lin et al.,
Do Dietary Intakes Affect Search for Nutrient Information on Food Labels?, 59 SOC.
SCI. & MED. 1955, 1962 (2004) (This study was actually a combination of studies
conducted in 1994, 1996 and 2000); Szanyi, supra note 11, at 162.
146
Roberto et al., supra note 144, at 316; Burton & Creyer, supra note 144, at
142; Margo G. Wootan & Melissa Osborn, Availability of Nutrition Information from
Chain Restaurants in the United States, 30 AM. J. PREVENTATIVE MED. 266, 268
(2006) (noting that even nutrition experts consistently underestimate the number of
calories in restaurant meals); Burton et al., Attacking the Obesity Epidemic: The
Potential Health Benefits of Providing Nutrition Information in Restaurants, 96 AM.
J. PUB. HEALTH 1669 (2006).
147
Roberto et al., supra note 144, at 316.
148
John C. Kozup et al., Making Healthful Food Choices: The Influence of
Health Claims and Nutrition Information on Consumers’ Evaluations of Packaged
Food Products and Restaurant Menu Items, 67 J. MKTG. 19, 23 (2003).
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packaged food item and a restaurant item, and because it also
tested the effect of health claims, which will be discussed in the
next section.
A 2004 survey by Burton & Creyer analyzed responses from
377 subjects after they saw a menu containing either no nutrition
information, a healthy food menu with nutrition information, or
an unhealthy food menu with nutrition information.149 Survey
results indicated that subjects were not aware of the unhealthy
nutrient level of foods, and suggested that the provision of
nutrition information affected “attitudes, perceptions, and
judgments.”150 Two 2006 studies also measured the differences
between consumer perception of nutrition levels against actual
nutritional content.151 In the first study, the 193 respondents
who were given a “less-healthful” menu underestimated calorie
content by almost 50%, fat content by 44 grams, and saturated
fat content by 15 grams.152 Sodium levels were also greatly
underestimated: by 847 mg for “more-healthful” foods, 1,557 mg
for “less-healthful” foods and a whopping 4,353 mg for “extremely
unhealthful” foods.153 In the second study, the 241 respondents
were provided with nutrition information in restaurants.154 This
study showed that calorie and nutrient information “influenced
attitudes, intentions, and choices.”155 Specifically, respondents
limited “less-healthful” choices when the nutritional information
was available.156 The authors concluded that “[b]ecause our
results showed that consumers substantially underestimated

149
Burton & Creyer, supra note 144, at 127–29. Survey questions asked
respondents to indicate their perception of the nutrition level of the items on the
menu they reviewed, as well as asking about item attitude and purchase intentions.
Id. at 143, app.
150
Id. at 121, 131.
151
Id.
152
Id. at 1671 (noting that the fat and saturated fat underestimations alone
amounted to “more than 60% of the recommended daily values.”).
153
Id. The recommended daily sodium intake value is less than 2,400 mg.,
according to the FDA. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., SODIUM IN YOUR DIET: USE THE
NUTRITION LABEL AND REDUCE YOUR INTAKE 1, in FOOD FACTS (June 2018),
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/food/ingredientspackaginglabeling/ucm315471.pdf.
154
Burton et al., supra note 146, at 1672–73.
155
Id. at 1674.
156
Id. For a healthy choice: when a chef’s salad was presented with just calorie
information, there was no decrease in purchase from when no information was
present. Id. But when other nutrition information was provided, there was a
significant decrease in the purchase of the chef’s salad, which makes sense because a
chef’s salad contains a moderate level of calories but a significantly high level of fats
and saturated fats. Id.
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calorie levels for less-healthful . . . items and that preference for
the less-healthful items diminished when nutrition information
was disclosed, provision of nutrition information . . . would
appear helpful.”157
In a telephone survey of 554 people in 2004, 85% of
respondents reported that they read nutrition labels and 66% of
them indicated that it was a factor in their purchasing
decisions.158 Another 2004 telephone survey of 649 community
members found that over 66% often viewed food labels and 18.9%
occasionally did.159
A 2005-2006 study of nearly 600 respondents who regularly
frequented fast-food establishments found that nearly 60% of
respondents chose “nutrition” as a very important purchasing
factor and 83.5% felt it was at least a somewhat important
factor.160 There was an approximately 150-calorie difference in
consumption for respondents who reported that nutritional
information was important to their purchasing decisions
compared to those who did not, and an approximately 300-calorie
difference when price was also important.161 In this study, the
majority of respondents placed a high value on nutritional
information, and chose fewer calories when given appropriate
nutritional information compared to those who did not place as
high a value on nutritional information. This result suggests
that providing granular nutritional information would be quite
useful to the large number of consumers who place a high value
on nutritional information, which is also the suggestion of other
studies from 1997-2010.162
157

Id.
Burros, supra note 141.
159
Rebecca A. Krukowski et al., Consumers May Not Use or Understand Calorie
Labeling in Restaurants, 106 J. AM. DIETETIC ASS’N 917, 918 (2006).
160
Harnack, et al., supra note 145, at 63, 68. Respondents received one of four
menus—with varying nutritional information—in which to order their food from,
and results were tabulated from this one-time order. Id. at 64–65.
161
Id. at 69, 71 tbl. 8 (stating that the average caloric intake was “significantly
lower” for participants who identified that nutrition was important and who received
calorie plus price information).
162
See also Lin et al., supra note 145, at 1962; Szanyi, supra note 11, at 162
n.27 (citing Matthew W. Kreuter et al., Do Nutrition Label Readers Eat Healthier
Diets? Behavioral Correlates of Adults’ Use of Food Labels?, 13 AM. J. PREVENTATIVE
MED. 277 (1997)); CHRISTIAN A. GREGORY ET AL., U.S. DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE,
CONSUMERS’ USE OF NUTRITION INFORMATION WHEN EATING OUT 31, 33 (2014).
(Consumers with healthy dietary habits are more likely to utilize health information
if provided in restaurants: People who have utilized health information at
restaurants, or indicate they’d do so if available, are likely to do so in the future; It is
158
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A 2008 study of 1,156 low-income residents took a first look
at the New York City (“NYC”) restaurant labeling requirement.163
Fast-food restaurant purchases by low-income participants were
compared to purchases by low-income members in Newark, New
Jersey, which does not have a restaurant labeling requirement,
before and after the NYC labeling requirement took effect.164
Fifty-four percent more NYC respondents noticed caloric
information after the labeling mandate, while at the same time
the percentage did not rise in Newark.165 After the labeling
mandate, nearly 28% of NYC responents indicated that caloric
information influenced their purcasing decisions, and 88%
indicated that they purchased fewer calories because of the
labeling.166 However, there was no significant decrease in the
number of calories consumed167 although information as to the
value that participants placed on nutritional information was not
ascertained.168 Although the mandatory restaurant labeling law
did not, at the time of this study, result in an overall significant
reduction in calories being consumed, it is not known if the
nutritional information positively affected the choices of healthconscious respondents. It is also not known if there were other
variables that could have affected the respondents’ purchasing
choices. Perhaps the restaurant choices of low-income consumers
are largely limited to fast-food establishments, which typically
sell highly caloric food at low cost. Another possibility is that
consumers will make their food selections by comparing items on
a menu and they “will view high-calorie choices as more
reasonable and healthy when they are presented among other
high-calorie options.”169 Or these results may simply indicate
that low-income consumers lack an understanding of their daily
caloric needs.170

suggested that health-conscious consumers actively look for health information but
others do not).
163
Elbel et al., supra note 141, at w1110.
164
Id. at w1110–11.
165
Id. at w1114–15; see id. at w1115 tbl. 1 (presenting a statistical graphic
comparison of those in New York City and Newark who noticed caloric information
and how it affected their purchases).
166
Id.
167
Id. at w1116–17.
168
Compare id. at w1113–14, with Harnack et al., supra note 145.
169
Szanyi, supra note 11, at 177.
170
Krukowski et al., supra note 159, at 918.
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When given the choice of a cheaper and healthier option,
low-income consumers in general may exercise more healthconscious choices. For instance, about one third of respondents
who noticed the nutritional information posted in Subway stores
ate fewer calories as compared to patrons who did not notice the
posted information.171
In 2007 and 2008, Subway, a fast food chain known for
healthy options, was studied; 303 respondents were shown one of
three menus to order a meal: a menu with no nutrition
information, one with nutrition information, and one with
nutrition information and a statement that the recommended
daily caloric intake is 2,000 calories.172 The three menu groups
were compared to determine the difference between estimated
calorie intake and actual intake.173 Subjects whose menus had no
nutrition information ordered on average approximately 330
more calories and consumed 177 more calories than subjects that
had nutrition information.174 The respondents whose menus did
not have nutrition information were not as accurate as were the
other groups in estimating caloric intake: nearly 75% of this
group underestimated calorie consumption and 25.6%
overestimated consumption, whereas the underestimated and
overestimated totals for the two groups whose menus had
nutrition information were nearly even, at about 50%.175 This
confirmed results from previous studies.176
Finally, in 2010, the International Food Information Council
Federation administered a food label survey to 7,363 respondents
designed to critique a proposed food label scheme change.177 The
survey found that 86% of respondents viewed food labels
“regularly or occasionally” before purchasing a product for the
first time, 85% “regularly or occasionally” read labels to compare
171
Mary T. Bassett et al., Purchasing Behavior and Calorie Information at FastFood Chains in New York City, 2007, 98 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1457, 1458 (2008).
These respondents were part of a large study of 7,318 respondents who frequented
several fast food establishments that provided nutrition information. Id. at 1457.
172
Roberto et al., supra note 144, at 312–13. After the meal, a questionnaire was
administered which was followed up with a recall interview the next evening. Id. at
313.
173
Id. at 316.
174
Id. at 315.
175
Id.
176
Kozup et al., surpa note 148, at 26.
177
INT’L FOOD INFORMATION COUNCIL FOUNDATION, supra note 143, at 8; Smith
Edge, supra note 116, at 844 (describing the study and also providing the data in
table form).
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nutritional values,178 and significantly more nutritional
information was comprehended when included on the front of
package label.179
B. Studies Regarding the Effectiveness of Health,
Structure/Function Claims, or Disclaimers
The dissemination of nutritional information about a food
product is not limited to the factual display of nutrients on a
label. It extends to claims that are allowed to be included on the
label. Therefore, it is important that we analyze studies on the
effectiveness of such claims. A summary of the results of the
following studies on the effectiveness of health and
structure/function claims suggest that (1) favorable health
information is best left on the nutrition facts panel,180 (2) the
shorter the health claim the better,181 (3) consumers are confused
by the current scheme of front-of-package labeling practices,182
and (4) manufacturers are largely not compliant with FDA rules
regarding structure/function claims,183 leading to more consumer
confusion because of unreliable product information on the label.
In addition, manufacturers do not always use the required FDA
label disclaimers for qualified health claims.184
Kozup et al. tested nearly 300 subjects on the effectiveness of
health claims and nutrition information on packaged products
and restaurant menu items.185 Respondents in both groups were
shown a product with no nutrition information, positive nutrition
information, or negative information, along with either a positive

178

INT’L FOOD INFORMATION COUNCIL FOUNDATION, supra note 143, at 123–24;
Smith Edge, supra note 116, at 845.
179
INT’L FOOD INFORMATION COUNCIL FOUNDATION, supra note 143, at 34;
Smith Edge, supra note 116, at 851.
180
Kozup et al., supra note 148, at 25 tbl 2.
181
Brian Wansink et al., Front-Panel Health Claims: When Less is More 10
(Sept. 1, 2004), http://foodpsychology.cornell.edu/sites/default/files/unmanaged_files/
Front-Label Health Claims Article.pdf.
182
Brenda M. Derby & Alan S. Levy, Effects of Strength of Science Disclaimers
on the Communication Impacts of Health Claims (Nov. 2005); Paben, supra note 74,
at 175.
183
DANIEL LEVINSON, DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF
INSPECTOR GENERAL, DIETARY SUPPLEMENTS: STRUCTURE/FUNCTION CLAIMS FAIL
TO MEET FEDERAL REQUIREMENTS 1, 9–12, 16 (2012).
184
Paula Fitzgerald Bone & Karen Russo France, Qualified Health Claims on
Package Labels, 28 J. PUB. POL’Y & MKTG. 253, 257 (2009).
185
Kozup et al., supra note 148, at 22–23.
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health claim or no health claim.186 Thus, comparisons could be
made between claims that matched or did not match nutrition
information on the nutrition facts panel or menu, as well as to
the effect of claims when the menu contained no nutrition
information.
Respondents who viewed the package label
containing favorable nutrition information and the heart health
claim recorded a positive effect on nutrition attitude, product
attitude, and purchase intention as compared to respondents who
viewed favorable nutrition information without a health claim.187
However, the positive health claim, combined with negative
nutrition information had a negative effect on product attitude,
purchase intention, and perceived credibility, suggesting that
consumers viewed health claims with skepticism and relied on
the nutrition facts panel as the more accurate means of judging
the healthfulness of a food.188 Results were similar for the
respondents who viewed the restaurant menu item.189 Kozup et
al. asserted that favorable nutrition information on the nutrition
facts panel is a better indicator of product purchase and product
attitude than favorable health claims.190 Perhaps, the more
accurate statement is that such is the case until food label laws
are streamlined.
Wansink et al. studied whether the length of health claims
affected respondents.191 In the study, 118 participants were
given the same product to view, but with either a short health
claim or a longer claim on the label.192 Results indicated that
consumers who saw the shorter claim understood the product
better and retained specific facts compared to those who saw the
longer claim.193

186
Id. at 21–22, 25; see id. at 25 (Table 2 provides breakdown of mean scores by
each of these factors).
187
Id. at 25 tbl. 2.
188
Id. at 25.
189
Id. at 25 tbl. 2. For respondents who reviewed the restaurant menu item, the
heart health claim also had a positive effect on nutrition attitude and intent to
purchase in both the no-nutrition information and positive nutrition information
groups, as well as having a positive effect on product attitude in the no-nutrition
information group. Id. As with results from respondents who viewed the product
label, the positive health claim had a negative effect on product attitude, purchase,
and perceived credibility when combined with negative nutrition information on the
menu. Id.
190
Id. at 25.
191
Wansink et al., supra note 181, at 3.
192
Id. at 7–8.
193
Id. at 10.
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Derby and Levy tested over 1,900 respondents on the effects
of disclaimers designed to convey the strength of scientific
evidence of health claims.194 They found that disclaimers did not
satisfactorily convey such evidence except to respondents with
strong health consciousness and respondents between ages 3045.195 Derby and Levy noted that text disclaimers were not
reliable at conveying the strength of scientific evidence and that
symbol disclaimers—report card grades instead of text—used in
conjunction with the health claim often caused respondents to
attribute a higher degree of healthfulness to a lower grade than
to a superior healthy product without a grade.196 They noted that
respondents viewed the information as some sort of marketing
endeavor, thus they reverted to their initial assessment of the
products instead of relying on the letter grades.197 At the least,
these findings point to consumer uncertainty because of having
different labeling mechanisms provided by different parties.
A 2006 study of nearly 1,300 product labels found few
products that were able to use qualified health claims actually
used them.198 Instead, they often used “structure–function
claims” or “nutrition content claims.”199 “Structure/function
claims” describe the role an ingredient plays in the “normal
structure or function of the human body.”200 Nutrition content
claims state the nutritional makeup of the product, and are
allowed as long as the FDA has defined the ingredient.201 Less
than 8% of the labels that were able to use unqualified health
claims—those not requiring an FDA disclaimer—did so.202 There
was a large difference between the percentages of the types of
claims used on foods versus supplements: structure/function
claims were the most prevalent claim on supplements (42.6%),
whereas nutrition content claims were most prevalent on foods
(26.8%).203 The authors of the study noted that plausible reasons
for manufacturers not using qualified health claims are because

194

Derby & Levy, supra note 182, at 1–3, 17–18.
Id. at 3, 32–34.
196
Id. at 34.
197
Id. at 37.
198
Bone & France, supra note 184, at 253–55, 257.
199
Id. at 253–54, 257.
200
Structure/Function Claims, supra note 36.
201
Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-535, § 3, 104 Stat.
2353, 2357 (1990) (codified at 21 U.S.C. 343).
202
Bone & France, supra note 184, at 257.
203
Id.
195
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nutrition content claims have few legal restrictions and because
the use of structure-function claims are not subject to the high
evidentiary standard associated with health claims, and they do
not require pre-market approval.204
The studies discussed above focused on consumers’ belief and
reliance on health claims and nutritional labels. Another means
of determining the effectiveness of food label laws is to study
manufacturer compliance with FDA requirements. If there is
substantial non-compliance with the FDA’s laws, it could lead to
consumer uncertainty or even false reliance on erroneous
information on food labels. Based on substantial concerns for the
accuracy of dietary supplement labels, the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services (“HHS”) recently analyzed
structure/function claims on 119 dietary supplements
manufactured by U.S. companies.205 Structure/function claims
address a documented nutrient deficiency disease (e.g., high
blood pressure, Rickets, Scurvy) and describe the positive role the
product’s nutrient or ingredient plays in addressing such a
deficiency, or how the ingredient or nutrient positively affects the
general well-being of the human body.206 A structure/function
claim cannot state that it “treat[s], cures, or prevents any
disease.”207 For example, “calcium builds strong bones” is an
allowable structure/function claim.208 However, the statement
“calcium prevents osteoporosis” is not allowed because it claims
to prevent a specific disease. Since structure/function claims do
not require pre-approval, the FDA requires three things from
manufacturers: (1) substantiation documentation must be
generated; (2) the FDA must be notified within thirty days of
marketing the product; and (3) a disclaimer must be used stating
that the FDA has not evaluated the statement.209 Although the
FDA cannot require documents be sent to them, the
manufacturer must create substantiation documents for
structure/function claims before the product is placed in the
market.210 In its study of structure/function claims of the 119
dietary supplements, HHS requested substantiation documents
204
205
206

Id.
LEVINSON, supra note 183 at 1, 8–9.
21 U.S.C. § 343(r)(6)(A) (2012); Structure/Function Claims, supra note 36, at

1.
207
208
209
210

21 U.S.C. § 343(r)(6)(C).
Id.; Structure/Function Claims, supra note 36.
21 U.S.C. § 343(r)(6)(C); Structure/Function Claims, supra note 36.
LEVINSON, supra note 183, at 4-5.
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and received them for seventy-two of the supplements.211
Contrary to the FDA requirement, only about one-third of the
substantiation documents were based on human studies.212 HHS
determined that none of the human studies satisfied all
recommendations of the FDA, and in fact only 2% of the human
studies pertained to the product in question.213 Finally, over 20%
of supplements contained prohibited disease treatment claims
and 7% did not contain the required disclaimer that the
statement has not been reviewed by the FDA.214
HHS
determined that the current system raises concerns of
unreliability since all three of the FDA requirements for products
making structure/function claims were largely unmet, and since
20% of supplements contained illegal disease prevention
claims.215
A large 2006 study found that 147 supplement labels using
structured/function claims did not use the mandatory disclaimer
indicating the FDA has not evaluated the product, and that
twenty labels made qualified health claims without the
mandatory FDA disclaimer.216
C. Commercial Speech and Health Claims
No evaluation of the effectiveness of food label laws is
complete without an analysis of how courts have applied the
four-part commercial speech test to food label claims. By looking
at how courts apply the test in different scenarios,
inconsistencies and errors in applying the law may be uncovered.
As previously noted, the Supreme Court in Central Hudson
Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Service Commission of New York set
forth the four-part test for determining if a government
restriction on commercial speech is valid: (1) whether the speech
is lawful and not misleading, if so (2) “whether the asserted
government interest is substantial,” (3) “whether the regulation

211

Id. at 9.
Id. at 11.
213
Id. at 12.
214
Id. at 16.
215
Id. at 15–18. To be fair, HHS noted that the FDA’s notification letter
electronic storage system could not be searched by keyword. Therefore, although
seventeen of the twenty-one letters the FDA was able to find were incomplete, it is
not known with certainty if the remaining manufacturers did not submit a letter or
if HHS simply could not retrieve them from the FDA storage system.
216
Bone & France, supra note 184, at 257.
212
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directly advances the governmental interest asserted,” and
(4) “whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve
that interest.”217
The government may satisfy the first prong of Central
Hudson if it can prove that the language in question is either
potentially or inherently misleading.218 Inherently misleading
speech can be fully banned.219 If speech is potentially misleading,
the FDA must consider whether the claim can be remedied with
a disclaimer.220 The FDA can ban potentially misleading speech
if it provides substantial evidence that the speech is actually
misleading and if a disclaimer cannot cure the misleading
speech.221 If the message targets a sophisticated audience, such
as the promotion of CPA services that are directed at experienced
business executives, the claim has been found not to be
deceptive.222 However, if the message in question targets the
general public or a vulnerable population, courts are more likely
to hold that the speech is misleading.223 For instance, in
American Academy of Pain Management v. Joseph, the Ninth
Circuit held that when a group of doctors used the phrase “board
certified” in advertisements even though they did not qualify as
board certified according the statutory definition, it was
inherently misleading to the general public and to other specific
groups.224 Along the same line, in Association of National

217

Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566

(1980).
218
Gerald Masoudi & Christopher Pruitt, The Food & Drug Administration v.
the First Amendment: A Survey of Recent FDA Enforcement, 21 HEALTH MATRIX: J.L.
& MED. 111, 121–122 (citing In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982)).
219
Id. at 121 (citing In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982)).
220
Id. at 121–22 (citing Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 376
(2002); and Ibanez v. Fla. Dep’t of Bus. & Prof’l Regulation, 512 U.S. 136, 146
(1994)).
221
Id. (citing Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 12–17 (1979); Thompson v. W.
States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 376 (2002); and Ibanez v. Fla. Dep’t of Bus. & Prof’l
Regulation, 512 U.S. 136, 146 (1994)).
222
Krista Hessler Carver, A Global View of the First Amendment Constraints on
FDA, 63 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 151, 172 (2008) (citing Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761,
775–76 (1993)).
223
Id. (citing Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 449, 465 (1985) for
the court’s blanket ban on in-person attorney solicitation “of vulnerable accident
victims”).
224
American Acad. of Pain Mgmt. v. Joseph, 353 F.3d 1099, 1108–09 (9th Cir.
2004).
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Advertisers, Inc. v. Lungren, the Ninth Circuit held that speech
defining certain environmental terms differently than was
required by law was potentially misleading to the public.225
Central Hudson states that a communication may be banned
if it is “more likely to deceive the public than to inform it.”226
Since Central Hudson, a standard for weighing the evidence
associated with health claims has developed: if a claim is
supported by significant scientific agreement then no disclaimer
is needed; if a claim is supported by credible evidence then it may
be used subject to an FDA disclaimer unless a disclaimer cannot
make the claim whole, in which case the FDA may ban the claim;
and if the claim is not supported by even credible evidence, then
the claim may be banned.227 This evidence-based standard can be
characterized as being less subjective and more fact-driven than
the “more likely to deceive” standard, better serving the need to
ensure reliable claims on the front label.228
In In re R.M.J., the Supreme Court held that potentially
misleading speech cannot be banned if it could be offered in a
non-deceptive way.229 The Court relied on Bates vs. State Bar of
Arizona, which generally suggested the preference for the use of
a disclaimer or an explanation over an outright ban for
misleading speech.230 The use of a disclaimer, however, was not a
requirement in Bates, which concerned truthful speech, not
misleading speech.231 In fact, it was an extraneous comment
about facts not at issue in the case. The Court in Bates noted
that the benefits derived from commercial speech required its
“accuracy and reliability” and then simply mentioned the use of a
disclaimer as one possible course of action for misleading speech,
as opposed to an outright ban, if the situation called for it.232
225
226

Ass’n of Nat’l Advertisers, Inc. v. Lungren, 44 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 1994).
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 563

(1980).
227

JAMES T. O’REILLY & KATHERINE A. VAN TASSEL, FOOD AND DRUG
ADMINISTRATION § 10:66 (4th ed. 2017); Evidence-Based Review System, supra note
43.
228
Evidence-Based Review System, supra note 43.
229
In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982) (citing Bates v. State Bar of Az., 433
U.S. 350, 375 (1977)).
230
Id.
231
Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977).
232
Id. at 383–384. As relating to misleading speech, the Bates court in dicta
stated:
Indeed, the public and private benefits from commercial speech derive from
confidence in its accuracy and reliability. Thus, the leeway for untruthful or
misleading expression that has been allowed in other contexts has little
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Therefore, In re R.M.J. misapplied Bates by relying on its dicta,
and further by incorrectly interpreting a requirement for a
disclaimer.
An important recent line of cases, which required the FDA to
issue disclaimers instead of banning the health claims, are of
limited scope and have misapplied the law. First, these decisions
should be considered to be of limited scope because one is from
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia and the
other three are from federal district court, which by definition
are of limited applicability geographically and as precedential
value.233 In fact, all four of these cases are from within the D.C.
Circuit. Second, these cases misapplied the law because the
health claims in question were not supported by significant
scientific evidence, the sole standard when Pearson I was
decided, or enough credible evidence to require a disclaimer.
The FDA initially had full support in the District of
Columbia jurisdiction. In siding with the FDA’s banning of the
nutritional supplement health claims in question, the Pearson I
trial court followed precedent at every turn when it held: (1) the
FDA’s conclusions were accorded a highly deferential standard of
review; (2) that the FDA’s adoption of the significant scientific
agreement standard was valid; and (3) that the four health
claims in question were properly banned for not having met that
standard.234 The trial court cited to the Supreme Court’s
precedent for its determination that the FDA is afforded a highly
deferential standard of review—“[t]he Court may not substitute

force in the commercial arena. In fact, because the public lacks
sophistication concerning legal services, misstatements that might be
overlooked or deemed unimportant in other advertising may be found quite
inappropriate in legal advertising. For example, advertising claims as to
the quality of services a matter we do not address today are not susceptible
of measurement or verification; accordingly, such claims may be so likely to
be misleading as to warrant restriction. Similar objections might justify
restraints on in-person solicitation. We do not foreclose the possibility that
some limited supplementation, by way of warning or disclaimer or the like,
might be required of even an advertisement of the kind ruled upon today so
as to assure that the consumer is not misled.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
233
The holdings of all of these cases apply to a small geographical area: the D.C.
Circuit and not to other circuits. Further, district court opinions are not binding as
precedent. They are only binding as to the litigants of the case: The FDA, Pearson,
and the rest of the litigants in the three district court cases.
234
Pearson v. Shalala (Pearson I (trial court)), 14 F. Supp. 2d 10, 15–19 (D.D.C.
1998).
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its judgment for that of the agency.”235 The trial court cited to
another Supreme Court case for authority that this high level of
agency deference is especially important when there is a
challenge to “an evaluation of complex scientific data within the
agency’s technical expertise.”236 The trial court then cited its
very own circuit court for its holding that stated the judicial
branch is not “to undertake comparative evaluations of
conflicting scientific evidence.”237 The trial court cited to In re
R.M.J. for its statement that a health claim is inherently
misleading if consumers do not have the knowledge to evaluate
it,238 and also cited to the scientific evidence and comments the
FDA evaluated when holding that the claims were rightfully
banned for lack of evidentiary support.239
The D.C. Circuit in Pearson I unilaterally disagreed with the
trial court, reversing its decision and banning the FDA
disclaimers.240 It relied on In re R.M.J. for its statement that a
ban on a potentially misleading claim is illegal “if the
information also may be presented in a way that is not
deceptive.”241 In other words, the court implied that a claim must
be allowed if a disclaimer can be crafted by the FDA that adds
information to make the claim complete. In re R.M.J. relied on
dicta from Bates v. State Bar of Arizona as authority for this
requirement.242 Even if the statements were merely potentially
misleading, the use of a disclaimer was only one suggestion by
the In re R.M.J. Court.243 The use of a disclaimer was not a
requirement by law. It is alarming that a disclaimer would be
required with no direct evidence to support the claim, and
therein is a fundamental problem with the court’s holding in
Pearson I.
Aside from the insistence that a disclaimer could remedy the
banned claims at hand, the Pearson I court clearly went further
than a reasonable reading of In re R.M.J. when suggesting that a
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Id. (citing Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S.
87, 103 (1983)).
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Id. (citing Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. E.P.A., 824 F.2d 1211, 1216 (D.C.
Cir. 1987)).
238
Id. at 18 (citing In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 202 (1982)).
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Pearson v. Shalala (Pearson I), 164 F.3d 650, 661 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
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Id. at 655 (citing In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 203).
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disclaimer could rectify the ills of the first three claim denials—
claims that had no supporting human studies on nutrition
supplements had ever been undertaken.244 The claims were
simply not proven by the significant scientific agreement
standard (there was no lesser credible evidence standard at this
time) and should have been allowed to be banned. This holding
leaves one to wonder if there would ever be a circumstance when
an outright ban of health claims would be possible.
Similarly, the Pearson I court also required a disclaimer for
the fourth claim that was outright rejected by the FDA, where
the agency had banned the statement “0.8 mg of folic acid in a
dietary supplement is more effective in reducing the risk of
neural tube defects than a lower amount in foods in common
form.”245 In justification, the court relied on one study that
concluded that “[l]osses [of folic acid] in cooking and canning
[foods] can be very high due to heat destruction.”246 This
evidence was not pertinent to the claim because it had nothing to
do with the effectiveness of folic acid in nutritional supplements
and no study assessed the effectiveness of folic acid in nutritional
supplements. Therefore, the claim should not have been allowed
at all, because it was not supported by evidence.
The Pearson I court incorrectly determined that the
arbitrary and capricious standard of the Administrative
Procedure Act required the FDA to explain why a disclosure was
not able to remedy the misleading claims,247 as there was no
evidence in direct support of the claims. In addition, this court
used its own interpretation of highly scientific evidence,248 even
though the Supreme Court has held that a high level of agency
deference is especially important when there is a challenge to “an
evaluation of complex scientific data within the agency’s
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Pearson I, 164 F.3d at 658.
Id. at 658–59.
246
Id. at 659 (alteration in original) (quoting DIET AND HEALTH: IMPLICATIONS
FOR REDUCING CHRONIC DISEASE RISK 67 (Committee on Diet and Health, Food and
Nutrition Board 1989)).
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Id. at 660.
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technical expertise,” 249 and although the judicial branch is not to
“undertake comparative evaluations of conflicting scientific
evidence.”250
The holdings of Pearson II, Pearson III, and Whitaker v.
Thompson, which are the progeny of the Court of Appeals
decision in Pearson I and which required the FDA to issue
disclaimers instead of banning those health claims, were
improperly decided for the same reasons given for Pearson I.
Further, Pearson II expanded on the Pearson I court’s improper
examination of the scientific evidence to show its disagreement
with how the FDA weighed the evidence and, in doing so, ignored
precedent from the Supreme Court.251 In fact, this very court
went against its pronouncement just three years earlier, when it
had properly applied the Supreme Court’s holding in Baltimore
Gas & Electric stating that agency deference is especially
necessary when evaluating “complex scientific data within the
agency’s technical expertise.”252 The Pearson II court justified its
actions with statements such as it was merely undertaking “a
cursory examination of the scientific literature” and that “[t]he
mere absence of significant affirmative evidence in support of a
particular claim . . . does not translate into negative evidence
‘against’ it.”253 Both quotes contradict the law. The evidentiary
frameworks of significant scientific agreement and credible
evidence are necessary to weigh all available evidence to
determine if the claim is misleading or not. But, not having
evidence to support a claim does not negate evidence to support a
ban. Finally, the Pearson II court claimed that a disclaimer was
necessary if there was any credible evidence at all to support the
health claim,254 even though Pearson I specifically stated that it
was possible for the FDA to determine that a disclaimer will not
cure a claim where evidence in support of the claim is weaker
than evidence against it.255

249

See Pearson v. Shalala (Pearson I (trial court)), 14 F. Supp. 2d 10, 15 (D.D.C.
1998) (citing Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87,
103 (1983)).
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Id.
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Pearson v. Shalala (Pearson II), 130 F. Supp. 2d 105, 114 (D.D.C. 2001).
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Pearson I (trial court), 14 F. Supp. 2d at 15.
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Pearson II, 130 F. Supp. 2d at 115.
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Id. at 118.
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Pearson v. Shalala (Pearson I), 164 F.3d 650, 659 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
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The Whitaker court also discussed the amount of evidence
needed to deny a health claim, stating an example that the
Pearson I court gave for evidence being qualitatively weaker than
contrary evidence defined a very narrow parameter for when a
claim may be denied.256
Whitaker also noted that the
government’s standard was to prove its action of banning
disclaimers was the least restrictive means of achieving its
goal.257 However, the standard set out in Central Hudson was
whether the fit between the government’s ends and the means
chosen to accomplish those ends is not necessarily perfect, but
reasonable.258 In addition, the Whitaker court, like the Pearson
courts, did not follow Supreme Court precedent by not deferring
to the FDA’s expertise.259
Aside from the FDA’s denial of the health claims in the
Pearson cases and in Whitaker for lack of sufficient evidence,
there are studies concluding that consumers are confused about
label claims. These studies have found that consumers do not
trust the current label scheme.260 There is precedent for allowing
studies to be submitted as evidence in courts. Courts have
accepted evidence from studies and anecdotes from areas outside
the jurisdiction of the court.261 Perhaps the results of those
studies may be coupled with cases such as Williams v. Gerber
Products Co., where the Ninth Circuit held that “reasonable
consumers” are not expected to “look beyond” the front of a
product label “to discover the truth,”262 to prove that incomplete
health claims are actually misleading to consumers and should
be banned. Either way, the best course of action is to defer to the
FDA and its expertise to carefully review health claims for
purposes of protecting the public. The front of the package is
likely the only place the majority of consumers will look for
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Whitaker v. Thompson, 248 F. Supp. 2d 1, 10–11 n.10 (D.D.C. 2002) (stating
that a complete ban would be reasonable when “evidence in support of the claim is
qualitatively weaker than evidence against the claim – for example, where the claim
rests on only one or two old studies.”) (emphasis omitted).
257
Whitaker, 248 F. Supp. 2d at 9.
258
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980).
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Whitaker, 248 F. Supp. 2d at 11.
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See supra Part IV.B.
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City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 50–51 (1986).
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Williams v. Gerber Prod. Co., 552 F.3d 934, 939–40 (9th Cir. 2008).
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nutrition information.263 Further, there is evidence that a health
claim must be succinct in order to be effective, and brevity is not
possible when supporting evidence is weak, as evidenced by the
lengthy disclaimers the FDA crafted in the Alliance I and
Alliance II cases as described below. For those reasons, the FDA
must have the ability to ban speech without the use of a
disclaimer to a higher degree than current case law allows.
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia
also rejected the precisely accurate summary of evidence that the
FDA included in its disclaimers in two fairly recent cases,
holding that the language was too detailed to survive the
reasonable fit prong of Central Hudson.264 The fourth part of the
Central Hudson test requires there be a reasonable fit between
the government’s objective and the restriction,265 which one
would think would be satisfied by limiting disclaimer language
exactly to the available evidence regarding the claim at question.
In fact, in order to assure compliance, the FDA guidance
procedures for qualified health claims unequivocally state that a
disclaimer “should include qualifying language that identifies
limits to the level of scientific evidence . . . with specificity and
accuracy.”266 In the first of two cases, Alliance I, the plaintiffs’
claim stated that “[s]elenium may reduce the risk of prostate
cancer. Scientific evidence supporting this claim is convincing
but not yet conclusive.”267 After a thorough review of the
evidence, the FDA found only two out of nine studies suggested
that “[s]elenium may reduce the risk of prostate cancer.”268 Then
the FDA issued the following disclaimer which mirrored their
evidentiary findings: “Two weak studies suggest that selenium
intake may reduce the risk of prostate cancer. However, four
stronger studies and three weak studies showed no reduction in
risk. Based on these studies, FDA concludes that it is highly
unlikely that selenium supplements reduce the risk of prostate

263
INT’L FOOD INFORMATION COUNCIL FOUNDATION, supra note 143, at 34; Edge
et al., supra note 115, at 851 (describing the above study and also providing the data
in table form).
264
All. for Nat. Health U.S. v. Sebelius, 714 F. Supp. 2d 48, 71 (D.D.C. 2010);
All. for Nat. Health U.S. v. Sebelius, 786 F. Supp. 2d 1, 24 (D.D.C. 2011).
265
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980).
266
Evidence-Based Review System, supra note 43, at § H.
267
All. For Nat. Health U.S., 714 F. Supp. 2d at 57 n.16.
268
Id. at 70–71.

2018]

SOLVING THE CRAZY MAZE OF FOOD LAWS

271

cancer.”269 The court held that such a disclaimer effectively
negated the claim and as such the reasonable fit test of Central
Hudson was violated.270 In doing so, the court discounted the fact
that the disclaimer precisely and accurately summarized the
evidence per the mandated FDA guidelines noted above. The
same may be said of the second case, Alliance II, where the court
rejected two FDA disclaimers that were similar in detail because
the claims failed to satisfy the reasonable fit requirement of the
Central Hudson test.271 Again, these disclaimers precisely stated
the strengths and weaknesses of the evidence as reviewed by the
expertise of the FDA.272 What better fit could there be than
including precisely accurate evidence in a disclaimer? The law
should permit the FDA to provide disclaimers that accurately
describe the evidence, regardless of whether the manufacturer’s
claim is negated.
Finally, a district court within the Second Circuit ruled on
this issue.273 Although this court allowed the FDA to accurately
summarize the evidence in its disclaimer,274 the court struck
down the disclaimer for other language.275 This underscores how
difficult it has become for the FDA to protect consumers. In
addition, since the case was decided in district court, it is of
limited precedential value. In this case, a plaintiff posited the
claim “that drinking green tea ‘may reduce the risk of breast or
prostate cancer.’ ”276 The FDA evaluated the evidence and found
that two of three breast cancer studies showed no link between
269

Id. at 71.
Id.
271
All. for Nat. Health U.S. v. Sebelius, 786 F. Supp. 2d 1, 24 (D.D.C. 2011).
272
Id. at 11, 23–24. One of the two plaintiffs’ health claims that the FDA
determined required a disclaimer was: “Vitamin E may reduce the risk of bladder
cancer. The scientific evidence for this claim is convincing, but not conclusive.” The
FDA’s disclaimer for this claim stated: “One small study suggests that Vitamin E
supplements may reduce the risk of bladder cancer. However, two small studies
showed no reduction of risk. Based on these studies, FDA concludes that it is highly
unlikely that vitamin E supplements reduce the risk of bladder cancer.” Id. at 23–24.
The other health claim stated that “Vitamin C may reduce the risk of gastric cancer.
The scientific evidence supporting this claim is persuasive, but not conclusive.” The
FDA disclaimer for this claim was: “One weak study and one study with inconsistent
results suggest that vitamin C supplements may reduce the risk of gastric cancer.
Based on these studies, FDA concludes that it is highly uncertain that vitamin C
supplements reduce the risk of gastric cancer.” Id. at 24.
273
See generally Fleminger, Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Servs., 854
F. Supp. 2d 192 (D. Conn. 2012).
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green tea and lower breast cancer rates, and a third study found
a positive benefit in a very limited population.277 The FDA found
“very limited credible evidence” for the claim in the prostate
cancer studies.278 Thus, the FDA determined that the claim
required a disclaimer.279 Although this court held that the
disclaimer language accurately summarized the evidentiary
findings, it held that an extra sentence in the disclaimer claiming
that the “FDA does not agree that green tea may reduce that
risk” was considered to be too restrictive and in violation of the
reasonable fit test.280
This case should give the FDA hope, however. Just as the
judges here turned to other decisions for guidance—up until this
case, they were all from courts within the D.C. Circuit—and then
reasonably held that it was appropriate for the FDA to provide a
precise summary of the evidence in the disclaimer, a court in
another jurisdiction could turn to this case for guidance and
decide to do the same. Given the confusion over front-of-package
labeling schemes that currently exists, how can effective and
believable disclaimers be crafted in cases where there is no direct
evidence to support the health claims or where disclaimer
language is restricted? Will a large number of consumers
mistakenly believe that since the FDA has authored a
disclaimer—even those disclaimers where the FDA was forced to
edit out strong verbiage—it is also endorsing the product?281 The
average consumer may conclude that if the FDA did not believe
the claim was properly worded based on the available scientific
evidence then it would not have allowed it to appear on the label.
Further, the average consumer likely does not know the FDA,
which is charged with assuring consumers that we can rely on
information contained on our food labels, is required to provide
disclaimers against its better judgment, or is required to modify
its disclaimer language by using verbiage it disagrees with, based
on its expert analysis of the evidence. For these reasons, it is a
bad idea to greatly curtail the FDA’s ability to ban claims.
Courts have been inconsistent in their treatment of evidence
used to prove that speech is potentially misleading. Although
mere conjecture by the government will not suffice as evidence,
277
278
279
280
281

Id. at 203.
Id.
Id. at 204.
Id. at 217–18.
Pearson v. Shalala (Pearson I), 164 F.3d 650, 655 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
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courts have determined that evidence may consist of references
to studies and anecdotes from areas outside the jurisdiction of
the court.282 However, in Association of National Advertisers, Inc.
v. Lungren, the court needed only two examples of evidence to
determine that speech was potentially misleading: (1) a plastic
bag labeled “recyclable” but could only be recycled if it was
returned to South Carolina; and (2) a disposable diaper labeled
“biodegradable” although it would take several hundred years for
it to biodegrade.283 Similarly, in Friedman v. Rogers, the
Supreme Court noted that the governing body in question was
merely familiar with past abuses and that was enough evidence
to determine that the speech was misleading.284 In Ackerman v.
Coca-Cola Co., the court found evidence of misleading speech in
the text of the FDA’s existing regulations.285 It appears that all
of these examples belie the tough stand that the D.C. Circuit has
taken to repeatedly deny FDA disclaimer language, especially in
light of Central Hudson. According to the first prong of Central
Hudson, communication may be banned if it is “more likely to
deceive the public than to inform it.”286 A rational analysis
would, for instance, allow a claim to be banned if the majority of
the evidence is weighed against it. In fact, the court in Pearson I
stated that such was a possibility.287 The Pearson I court also left
open the idea that the government could possibly prove that
disclaimers would confuse the public.288
The second prong of Central Hudson, a substantial
government interest, is met in health claims disputes where the
government’s mission is to protect the “health, safety, and
welfare of its citizens” and to protect citizens from misleading
advertising.289
282

City of Renton v. Playtime, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 50–52 (1986).
Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 33 n.14, Ass’n of Nat’l Advertisers, Inc., v.
Lungren, 44 F.3d 726 (9th Cir. 1994) (No. 93-15644).
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285
Ackerman v. Coca-Cola, Co., No. CV-09-0395(JG)(RML), 2010 WL 2925955,
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The third prong of Central Hudson, whether the regulation
directly advances the governmental interest asserted, also
requires that the government provide evidence. Lungren stated
that this prong was satisfied if the fit between the government’s
interest and the restriction is “simply reasonable.”290 In Lungren,
the court held that the legislature’s belief that uniform standards
would promote consumer protection was enough to directly
advance the governmental interest.291 Similarly, the Lungren
trial court cited to the Supreme Court case Posadas v. Tourism
Co. of Puerto Rico for its acceptance of the legislature’s belief
regarding casino gambling advertising.292 Further, the court in
Joseph accepted the legislative history of the law as evidence
that this prong was met.293
The court in Pearson I held that the fourth prong of Central
Hudson, whether the fit between the government’s ends and the
means chosen to accomplish those ends is reasonable, was not
met because the use of a disclaimer was a reasonable lessrestrictive means than an outright ban of the claims in
question.294
Notwithstanding the prior analysis of Pearson I, which
concluded that the FDA should not have had to issue disclaimers
in the first place, the court’s claim that a less-restrictive means
was required is not accurate. Courts have determined that the
fourth prong does not require that the government act with the
least restrictive means available to it. The Joseph court rejected
such an argument by the plaintiff in response to a state banning

of its citizens.”); Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 341
(1986) (holding that government restrictions on casino gambling advertisements
were a substantial interest because they protected the “health, safety, and welfare of
its citizens”); Pearson I, 164 F.3d at 655–56 (quoting Rubin, 514 U.S. at 485 (finding
that an FDA regulation requiring its approval of health claims not meeting the
“significant scientific agreement” threshold was considered to be a substantial
government interest, in that the regulation was aimed at preventing consumer fraud
and “promoting the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens.”)); American Acad. of
Pain Mgmt. v. Joseph, 353 F.3d 1099, 1108–09 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding the
government had substantial interest in protecting members of the public from
misleading advertisements); U.S. Food & Drug Admin., What We Do, About FDA,
https://www.fda.gov/aboutfda/whatwedo/default.htm (last updated Mar. 28, 2018).
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Ass’n of Nat’l Advertisers v. Lungren, 44 F.3d 726, 732 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing
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the phrase “board certified” from physician advertisements.295 In
Board of Trustees of State University of New York v. Fox, the
government banned Tupperware parties in student dorm rooms
because of their commercial element.296 The Supreme Court
noted the least restrictive means of regulating commercial speech
need not be chosen, and the government will determine the best
method for regulating such speech.297 In City of Cincinnati v.
Discovery Network, Inc., the dissenting justices of the Supreme
Court stated the claim that the government was required to
choose a less restrictive means of regulating commercial speech
had been “discredited,” and that the cases which held that the
government’s restrictions failed the fourth prong of the Central
Hudson test were “substantially excessive, disregarding far less
restrictive and more precise means.”298
IV. SUGGESTED IMPROVEMENTS
Food laws must be streamlined to become an effective tool
for consumer protection. Eliminating unnecessary and confusing
laws is directly in line with the current administration’s edict to
cut bureaucracy.
Many authors have eloquently argued for sundry logical
changes to food laws, such as the FDA relying less on guidance
documents and more on the notice and comment provision of §
553 of the Administrative Procedure Act.299
Many other
reasonable changes could be made. For example, Winters
advocates for state regulation of health claims and the repeal of
the health and nutrient content claims provisions of the NLEA,
which would save federal money.300 Mortazavi suggests that
allowing individual lawsuits would force change in the
industry.301 Mortazavi illustrates this point by highlighting
recent litigation on the use of the term “natural,” which
convinced companies who were not part of the litigation to
voluntarily drop the term from their labels.302
Mortazavi
295
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City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 441 (1993)
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citing Fox at 478–79).
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Diana R. H. Winters, The Magical Thinking of Food Labeling: The NLEA As
A Failed Statute, 89 TUL. L. REV. 815, 859 (2015).
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Mortazavi, supra note 86, at 931–32, 969–70.
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recognized that individual lawsuits allow for public involvement
in food law policy, which is necessary for government
accountability and also serves as a means of instituting positive
change for consumers.303 Paben suggests that a federal private
right of action be added to the FDCA, which would enhance the
FDA’s control over food laws.304 Zarski argues that courts should
interpret the NLEA preemption provision more narrowly so that
a higher number of misleading label claims could be brought in
state courts.305 Zarski notes that 21 U.S.C. § 343(a)(1) bars all
false or misleading label claims, thus suggesting that all state
law claims for misleading labels should be allowed under existing
law.306
The sheer number of reasonable solutions that have been
posited over the past several years are staggering and there are
far too many to implement. There needs to be a workable
solution created from the surplus of solutions recently offered.
This Article’s proposed improvements to food laws will be limited
to establishing a simple mandatory front-of-package labeling
scheme that will include: (1) eliminating structure/function
claims; (2) greatly revising and simplifying nutrition content
claims laws; (3) having the FDA issue letter grades for products
based on evidence of health claims while allowing agreed-on
health claims language to appear on the label; and (4) deferring
to the expertise of the FDA in the courts.
Although some of the Article’s solutions are not new, the
specific combination is unique and will greatly enhance the
FDA’s ability as a primary consumer advocate organization.
Paben calls for the FDA to change its regulations to ensure
better, uniform food laws that are less confusing to consumers.307
Negowetti suggests that the FDA require the significant
scientific agreement standard for all label claims. 308 Thus, we

303
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should simply require FDA pre-approval of all label claims.309
This will serve to eliminate the confusion caused by having
multiple claims schemes. The current rules and guidelines for
structure/function claims are confusing and rarely complied
with.310 For instance, the statement “improves joint mobility and
reduces inflammation” is not allowed because it implies a cure for
rheumatoid
arthritis,
but
the
statement
“improves
absentmindedness” is allowed because, although many
consumers may equate that statement with a treatment for
Alzheimer’s disease, absentmindedness is also characteristic of
non-disease symptoms.311 For these reasons, structure/function
claims are inherently misleading to consumers. It would be
better if such claims were prohibited.
Nutrient content claims allow manufacturers to describe the
level of nutrients in a product, on its label, if the FDA defined the
level—these are levels such as “low in,” “high in,” reduced, lite;
e.g., “low in fat.”312 The laws regarding nutrient content claims
should be greatly streamlined,313 to comply with a new
mandatory front-of-package labeling scheme, which along with
restructured health claims laws, described below, make the
current nutrition content claims scheme obsolete.
The new nutrition content scheme will eliminate confusion
by limiting the number of nutrition content messages that
appear on the front of the package and utilizing short, concise
statements. Currey proposed that the FDA should mandate
front-of-package disclosures for certain potentially harmful
ingredients when products contain more than the daily value of
those ingredients.314 Currey argued that sugar and sodium levels
309
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should be required.315 Along that same line, the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”) recognized that front-ofpackage labeling would be most effective if the information is
limited to the most important health-related nutrients,
considering the need for more uniformity in front-of-package
schemes caused by the many different ways that manufacturers
present information.316 The Institute of Medicine recommends
that front of the package labels include unhealthful amounts of
calories, sugars, saturated fats, and sodium levels be required if
one of these ingredients exceeded the daily value by a certain
percentage.317 Hayes suggests only having a requirement for
nutrition claims for offending ingredients, and not allowing
beneficial claims at all.318
This is in line with Kozup’s
experiments which concluded the Nutrition Facts panel, on the
back of the product, is the best place for positive product
information to appear.319
Since a front-of-package labeling
scheme must include just a few ingredients, the FDA should not
allow the inclusion of beneficial claims, such as “low in sodium.”
Only negative nutrition claims (or more accurately, negative
nutrition disclaimers) for a few important ingredients should be
required on the label. It is sufficient to flag sugars, saturated
fats, sodium levels, and calories that are well above the
recommended daily value established by the Institute of
Medicine. Doing so quickly alerts those consumers who must
watch their food intake of the risks involved with eating certain
foods.
Health-conscious consumers will already scour the
Nutrition Facts panel on the back of the product for healthful
to provide a small amount of information in one prominent place, which “squares
with what we know about the limits of human attention.”).
315
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Sugar” must be used on the label. Currey also stated that trans fats should be
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information. But those who are not necessarily healthy eaters
likely will not view the Nutrition Facts panel and therefore
would find the negative information on the front useful. This
scheme clearly places consumers on alert for critical negative
ingredient information while still providing a means of
identifying positive product attributes by viewing the Nutrition
Facts panel on the back of the product. By expanding on
Currey’s scheme, the current practice of selectively including
only favorable information on the front of the package will be
eliminated.320 Not only would these ingredient listings be the
most helpful information to consumers, but limiting the list to
just a few ingredients would minimize or eliminate confusion.
Mandatory nutrition content disclosures would replace the
currently allowed claims. They would be worded more directly
than the “See nutrition information for _____ content” disclosure
that is currently required if a product contains more than a
certain level of fat, cholesterol, or sodium.321 The current
disclosure language leaves the burden of discovering nutrient
deficiencies on the reader who has to think to check the
Supplement Facts label on the back of the product. Front-ofpackage disclosures should be direct statements that leave no
doubt of the nutrient deficiency. Research concluded that short
claims are more effective than long claims.322 For products that
contain levels of the above-mentioned ingredients higher than
the daily value, Currey suggests that the mandatory disclosure
language should simply be “High in _____,”323 with the offending
ingredient in the blank space. The FDA should consider using
two categories here—“high” and “very high.” The FDA has
already established a baseline of 20 percent above the daily value
as being “high”324 and there is no reason to discard that
definition. I suggest that a second category of “very high” should
also be used, leaving the FDA to define the term. This would
incentivize manufactures to lower the level of harmful
ingredients in their products.
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As others note, the health claims scheme also requires
modification.325 The introduction of a simple letter grade system
for health claims would help eliminate the confusion caused by
structure/function claims and nutrition content claims. Because
consumers are familiar with letter grades, the FDA should assign
a letter grade to every health claim based on the level of evidence
that exists in support or opposition to the health claim. The
letter grades would be prominently placed on the front label of
the product, next to the health claim. In 2009, the FDA
experimented with a grading scheme in which unqualified health
claims received an A grade since they were supported by
significant scientific agreement, and qualified claims received
grades from B through D, with a brief statement that the FDA
had assigned the grade based on the evidence.326 The letter grade
experiment showed some success.327 Evidence from an earlier
FDA report card experiment suggested that having fewer letter
grades would help consumers properly identify the strength of
evidence in support of a claim328 and it would be up to the FDA to
consider such a modified grading scheme. Additionally, a grading
scheme, which incentivizes manufacturers to achieve a high
grade, places the burden and cost of testing on the manufacturers
who see 50% profit margins on supplements.329
325
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Using a well-recognized grading scheme will provide
certainty to the consumer in two meaningful ways. First, only
one entity would assign the grade, not manufacturers or trade
associations.
Second, the governing agency tasked with
consumer protection, not the manufacturer,330 assigns the grade.
However, the grading scheme may run afoul of commercial
speech laws that recently arose when the FDA attempted to deny
qualified health claims, as discussed in Part IV.C. Therefore,
health claims should be allowed on the label—except if a total
ban is appropriate— subject to disclaimer modifications by the
FDA. In addition, the courts should give the FDA strong agency
deference in analyzing its evidence, as per Auer v. Robbins.331 In
that way, letter grades would not replace the text of health
claims, and the FDA would be allowed to signal to consumers the
strength of the claim by way of a simple format that is supported
by the FDA’s evidentiary standards.
The use of this new health claims scheme would require the
FDA to spot test products that are on the market, which would
require additional funding. To the extent that this would require
additional resources and staffing, Dickens has several
suggestions that would help. She suggests the FDA could reward
states if they assist in its regulatory efforts, for instance
providing product-testing facilities for the FDA to use.332 Dickens
also suggests that tax incentives could encourage relevant state
and federal agencies to “pool their budgets to help test dietary
supplements.”333
The FDA should also focus efforts on approving qualified
health claims as another means of streamlining the process.334
Under the new scheme, all products with qualified health claims
would automatically receive an A letter grade.
In those
instances, there is no lengthy, complicated FDA process to
navigate or the possibility of ensuing lawsuits over claim denials
because of weight of evidence issues.
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330
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Finally, courts have misinterpreted First Amendment
commercial speech laws relating to health claims. Courts have
misinterpreted the law by holding that FDA disclaimers are too
strongly worded and wholly negate the health claim of the
plaintiffs—even with accurate and precise language based on an
expert summary of the evidence. Courts challenged the expertise
of the FDA in denying its decision to disallow a claim when it
was not supported by credible evidence. Courts have misapplied
the FDA’s evidentiary standard. Admittedly, these limiting cases
are all from one jurisdiction (courts within the D.C. Circuit), but
a promising case having been decided in a court within the
Second Circuit. Nonetheless, the FDA must be allowed to
properly protect the public from misleading health claims by
exercising the highest degree of administrative deference as
recognized for administrative agencies in Auer v. Robbins.335 The
Article’s proposed improvements to food laws will have a
profound positive effect on the convoluted, detailed, and crazy
maze of food label and claims laws that currently exist. By
establishing a simple mandatory front-of-package labeling
scheme that will include: (1) eliminating structure/function
claims; (2) greatly revising and simplifying nutrition content
claims laws; (3) having the FDA issue letter grades for products
based on evidence of health claims while allowing agreed-on
health claims language to appear on the label; and (4) deferring
to the expertise of the FDA in the courts, consumer protection
will be greatly enhanced.
CONCLUSION
The FDA has the burdensome but crucial task of ensuring
that our food is safe and adequately represented in the
marketplace. Currently, food laws are ineffective and strip the
FDA of the clout it needs to be a proper watchdog agency. As a
result, the FDA is far less effective. By improving food laws and
prioritizing FDA actions, a more consumer-oriented agency will
emerge to provide adequate protections for unsuspecting
consumers. Our nation is fortunate enough to have the resources
to make this critical change a reality. The question is whether
we have the ability to transcend political and industry forces to
make it a priority.
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